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RECENT CHANGES IN CALIFORNIA AND
FEDERAL USURY LAWS: NEW




If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee,
thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay
upon him usury.'
Recent record high interest rates have focused attention on state
usury laws-laws that were originally designed primarily to protect ne-
cessitous borrowers from loan sharks and other unscrupulous lenders.
2
However, when the interest rates charged for prime commercial loans
and real estate loans exceed the rates permitted by state usury laws,
such laws disrupt normal financial markets and no longer serve to pro-
tect borrowers but instead operate to deny them access to vitally
needed credit. This situation has produced legislation in a number of
states to amend state usury laws in order to keep pace with rapidly
escalating interest rates. However, the increase has been so rapid that
many states have been unable to react in time to pass new legislation.
As a result, Congress has preempted all state usury laws with respect to
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1. Exodus 22:25.
2. "Such laws are intended as a bulwark to protect the needy from the greed of the
rapacious. It is the theory of such enactments that those in distress might be
plunged into deeper distress if the law did not come to their relief and protect them
from the money lender, who would prey upon misfortune and wring from the
needy borrower, in his endeavor to tide over present difficulty, the utmost farthing
as compensation for what is often an evanescent benefit-merely putting off of an
evil day."
Wooten v. Coerber, 213 Cal. App. 2d 142, 148-49, 28 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (1963) (quoting In
re Washer, 78 Cal. App. 759, 771-72, 248 P. 1068, 1073 (1927)).
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certain business and agricultural loans and residential real estate
loans.3 This new federal legislation is discussed briefly in Section V.
Amending California's Usury Law has always presented a special
problem because, unlike the usury laws of most other states, Califor-
nia's Usury Law is contained in the California Constitution 4 and thus
can be amended only by popular vote. Until recently, California's
Usury Law was among the most restrictive in the nation. Thus, when
market rates exceeded maximum permissible interest rates in Califor-
nia, many lenders, particularly institutional lenders engaged in sub-
stantial real estate lending, were unable to lend in California and
directed their investments to other states. Previous attempts, once in
1970 and twice in 1976, to amend the Usury Law in response to unprec-
edented high interest rates proved unsuccessful.' The return of high
interest rates and double-digit inflation in 1979 again produced severe
problems, sharply reducing the amount of money available for mort-
gage lending and further increasing the rate of interest charged on the
money that was available.7 California borrowers often sought financ-
ing from non-California lenders and attempted to avoid the application
of the California Usury Law by choosing the law of the lender's state,
which often was much more favorable. Although such transactions
were generally believed to be valid, until recently there were few Cali-
fornia cases expressly upholding this approach. Some lenders were un-
3. See the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132.
4. CAL. CONST. art. 15, § 1 (formerly art. 20, § 22). The 1934 constitutional amend-
ment superseded in part a 1918 initiative measure, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1916-1 to 1916-3
(West 1954). Together, the two measures are referred to herein as the "Usury Law."
5. See generally Curotto, Conflict of Laws and Usury in California: The Impact on Flow
ofMortgage Funds, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 441 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Curotto].
6. These Propositions may be summarized as follows:
(a) Proposition 10, submitted to the voters as part of the general election on Novem-
ber 3, 1970, would have included in the list of exemptions a loan or forbearance to a corpo-
ration or partnership if the principal amount of the loan was in excess of $100,000. 1970
Cal. Stats. ch. res. 113. The proposition was defeated. Id A-104.
(b) Proposition 12, submitted to the voters as part of the primary election on June 8,
1976, would have kept the maximum rate of interest on loans for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes at 10%, but allowed the parties to contract in writing for a rate not exceeding
7% per annum in excess of the federal discount rate. 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. res. 132. The
proposition was defeated. Id A-163.
(c) Proposition 5, submitted to the voters as part of the general election on November
2, 1976, was generally the same proposal as Proposition 12, which had been submitted to the
voters on June 8, 1976. 1976 Cal. Stats. ch. res. 53. This proposition was also defeated. Id
A-164.
7. "Until Proposition 2, California usury law not only blocked off outside money com-
ing into the state. .. but just as effectively drove out home-grown money." L.A. Times,
Feb. 3, 1980, Part IX, at 14, col. 1.
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willing to assume the risk of a possible usury violation and
discontinued making loans to California borrowers. As a result, the
California legislature again recommended that a constitutional amend-
ment be placed on the ballot to make the California Usury Law more
flexible. This time, however, to the surprise and delight of most law-
yers, institutional lenders, and commercial borrowers, the amendment,
known as Proposition 2, was enacted on November 6, 1979 and became
effective November 7, 1979.8
Proposition 2 made some important changes in the California
Usury Law, and prior to the recent rapid rise in interest rates caused by
federal monetary policy, there were some indications that Proposition 2
was a factor in reducing the rates charged for real estate loans.9 As
with much new legislation, however, some problems and questions re-
main. This article briefly reviews the California Usury Law and then
considers some of the problems and questions created by the enactment
of Proposition 2 and the Depository Institutions Act, with emphasis on
the application of such laws to real estate and commercial loans.'0 The
article also considers the effect the enactment of Proposition 2 may
have on the validity of provisions in loan agreements which choose the
law of a state other than California to govern the transaction.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CALIFORNIA USURY LAW
A. The Usury Law
Prior to the enactment of Proposition 2, the California Usury Law
rested on two principal foundations: a statute adopted as an initiative
measure in 191811 and an amendment to the California Constitution
8. Proposition 2 was proposed by the California Legislature as Assembly Constitu-
tional Amendment No. 52 (1979 Cal. Stats. ch. res. 49) and became effective November 7,
1979. CAL. CONST. art. 18, § 4. The text of Proposition 2 is set forth in full in the Appendix
to this article.
9. "Rates already are lower in California than they would have been without the pas-
sage of Proposition 2. . . ." L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1980, Part III, at 16, col. 2. See also L.A.
Times, supra note 7. Although interest rates remain unusually high in California, the pri-
mary cause appears to be national monetary policy, not California usury policy.
10. For another discussion of Proposition 2, see Bosko & Larmore, Practice Under The
New California Usury Law, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 58 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bosko &
Larmore]. Proposition 2 did not make any significant changes in many fundamental areas
of the California Usury Law. Issues such as what constitutes a "loan or forbearance," what
constitutes "interest," and how interest is computed remain essentially unaffected by Propo-
sition 2 and are not discussed in this article. For a general discussion of the California
Usury Law prior to the enactment of Proposition 2, see Comment, Calfornia's ModelAp-
proach to Usury, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1381 (1966); Comment, A Comprehensive View of Calfor-
nia Usury Law, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 166 (1974).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1916-1 to 1916-5 (West 1954).
1979]
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that was adopted in 1934.12 The 1934 constitutional amendment pro-
vided that the maximum permissible rate of interest with respect to any
loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action was 7% per
annum, but that the parties could contract in writing for a rate not in
excess of 10% per annum. It also provided that these restrictions did
not apply to California savings and loan associations,' 3 California in-
dustrial loan companies, 14 California credit unions,'5 California pawn-
brokers,16 California personal property brokers,'7  California and
national banks,"8 and certain California nonprofit agricultural lend-
ers. 19 The legislature was given the power to regulate these lenders,
including the power to set maximum interest rates.20 The legislature
has not set maximum rates for most commercial loans,2' and many ex-
empt lenders, such as banks and savings and loan associations, are not
subject to any interest rate limitation.22
12. CAL. CONST. art. 15, § 1 (formerly art. 20, § 22). The 1934 amendment did not re-
peal the initiative statute but merely superseded it wherever there was a conflict. See, e.g.,
Clarke v. Horany, 212 Cal. App. 2d 307, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963).
13. Associations are defined in the Building and Loan Association Act. CAL. FIN. CODE
§§ 5000-5026 (West 1968 & Supp. 1979). Although federal savings and loan associations
have generally been assumed to be exempt lenders, there is no specific reference to them in
the Usury Law. Presumably, a federal association is an association which is "defined in and
which is operated under" the provisions of the California Financial Code. See, e.g., CAL.
FIN. CODE §§ 5055, 11000 (West 1968). In order to confirm their exempt status, Senator
Russell has introduced a bill in the California legislature which specifically provides that
federal savings and loan associations are exempt lenders. SB 1694, Cal. Legis. 1979-80 Reg.
Ses. (Mar. 4, 1980). See also note 48 infra.
14. These are defined in "An act defining industrial loan companies, providing for their
incorporation, powers and supervision." CAL. FIN. CODE. §§ 1800-1826 (West 1968 & Supp.
1979).
15. These are defined in "An act defining credit unions, providing for their incorpora-
tion, powers, management and supervision." Id. §§ 14000-14008.1.
16. Pawnbrokers are persons engaged in the business of receiving goods in pledge as
security for a loan. Id. §§ 21000-21001, 21200, 21200.5, 21200.7, 21208.
17. These are defined in the Personal Property Brokers Act. Id. §§ 22000-22013.
18. These are defined in and operate under the "Bank Act." Id. §§ 99-151; CAL. CONST.
art. 15, § 1.
19. Nonprofit cooperative associations are organized under CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE
§§ 54001-54294 (West 1968 & Supp. 1979); CAL. CONST. art. 15, § 1.
20. "The Legislature may from time to time prescribe the maximum rate per annum of,
or provide for the supervision, or the filing of a schedule of, or in any manner fix, regulate or
limit, the fees. . . or other compensation which all or any of the said exempted classes of
persons may charge or receive from a borrower. . . ." CAL. CONST. art. 15, § 1.
21. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 22053 (West Supp. 1979).
22. "[U]ntil the legislature exercises the power granted to it by the amendment to regu-
late the business of lenders . . . the class not so governed by legislation is subject to no
restriction on interest rates or charges." Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 582,
203 P.2d 758, 770 (1949). See also Hiatt v. San Francisco Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.
1966) (banks which operate under the laws of California not subject to any restriction on
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B. Penalties for Usury
If a transaction is determined to be usurious, the lender may be
subject to both civil and criminal sanctions. The statute provides that
any usurious contract is void with respect to the obligation to pay inter-
est and that the principal is not due until the expiration of the loan and
cannot be accelerated as a result of a default in the payment of inter-
est.23 The obligation to pay principal, however, remains unaffected and
the lender may enforce such obligation in accordance with its terms.2 4
The extent of the remedies is affected by the type of action initiated by
the lender or the borrower. If the borrower brings an action for money
had and received, he may recover all interest paid on a usurious loan,
not merely the usurious excess, but the recovery is subject to a two-year
statute of limitations.25 When the lender sues to enforce payment, the
borrower may raise usury as a defense, and the statute of limitations
does not preclude the borrower from offsetting all interest paid, thereby
reducing the principal of the loan.26 Because a claim of usury thus
affects the total amount due the lender, a borrower often will be able to
enjoin a foreclosure action or other attempted enforcement of liens on
collateral until the validity of the usury claim is judicially deter-
mined.27 Finally, the defense of usury may not be waived by the bor-
rower at the time the loan is made, although a usury claim may be
subsequently settled or compromised as any other claim.2"
In addition to the foregoing remedies, a borrower may recover
treble the amount of interest paid in the year preceding the action.29
interest rates); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 20, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376,
382 (1964) (legislature has imposed no maximum rate for banks).
23. Any agreement or contract of any nature in conffict with the provisions of this
section shall be null and void as to any agreement or stipulation therein contained to
pay interest and no action at law to recover interest in any sum shall be maintained
and the debt can not be declared due until the full period of time it was contracted
for has elapsed.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1916-2 (West 1954) (emphasis added).
24. Harris v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 255 P. 805 (1927).
25. Stock v. Meek, 35 Cal. 2d 809, 221 P.2d 15 (1950).
26. In re Vehm Eng'r Corp., 521 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1975); Simmons v. Patrick, 211 Cal.
App. 2d 383, 27 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1962); Shirley v. Britt, 152 Cal. App. 2d 666, 313 P.2d 875
(1957).
27. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Superior Mortgage Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 246, 325 P.2d 156
(1958); Middlekauf v. Vinson, 106 Cal. App. 2d 204, 234 P.2d 742 (1951).
28. Lamb v. Herndon, 97 Cal. App. 193, 275 P. 503 (1929). See also Kogan v. Bergman,
244 Cal. App. 2d 613, 53 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1966) (entirely new agreement which purges the old
transaction of usury will be enforceable).
29. Every [borrower] who for any loan or forbearance of money, goods or things in
action shall have paid or delivered any greater sum or value than is allowed to be
received under the preceding sections . . . may . . . recover in an action at law
19791
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The recovery of treble interest is a cumulative remedy so that the bor-
rower can recover treble the interest paid within one year of the com-
mencement of the suit, plus actual interest paid prior to the year
preceding the action and within two years of the suit." Finally, the
awarding of treble interest is always subject to the discretion of the
court.3 '
A lender may also be subject to criminal sanctions as a result of
making a usurious loan. The 1918 statute made it a misdemeanor to
violate the Usury Law.32 In 1970, however, this section of the Usury
Law was amended by an initiative measure which provides that any
person who willfully makes a loan with interest in excess of the maxi-
mum allowed by law may be guilty of "loan-sharking, a felony ...
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five
years or in the county jail for not more than one year."'
33
C. Recent Constitutional Challenge
Although the 1934 constitutional amendment was intended to
make California's Usury Law more flexible,34 it did not prove to be
responsive to the rapid escalation of interest rates that occurred several
times in the 1970's. Many institutional lenders, particularly those who
engaged in substantial real estate lending activity, were not included in
against the [lender] who shall have taken or received the same ...treble the
amount of money so paid. . . providing such action shall be brought within one
year after such payment or delivery.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-3(a) (West Supp. 1979). The recovery of treble interest is allowed
only when the borrower has actually paid interest. Coulter v. Collins, 71 Cal. App. 381, 235
P. 465 (1925).
30. "It is settled that section 3 of the Usury Law providing for treble damages affords the
borrower an additional remedy, in the nature of a penalty, which is cumulative to the other
remedies for usury." Alston v. Goodwin, 174 Cal. App. 2d 16, 19, 343 P.2d 993, 995 (1959)
(citations omitted). See also Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 18 P.2d 333 (1933).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-3(a) (West Supp. 1979) states that a party may receive treble
the interest paid. See also Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp., 71 Cal. 2d 983, 458 P.2d 185, 80
Cal. Rptr. 345 (1969) (granting of treble damages is discretionary with the trial court); Mc-
Clung v. Saito, 4 Cal. App. 3d 143, 84 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1970). But see McConnell v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 21 Cal. 3d 365, 379, 578 P.2d 1375, 1383, 146 Cal. Rptr.
371, 379 (1978) (trial court does not exercise abstract discretion, but must base its ruling on
facts of transaction at issue).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-3 (West 1954).
33. Id § 1916-3(b) (West Supp. 1979).
34. "[T]he only cure [to the problems created by the existing Usury Laws] is the enact-
ment of a measure sufficiently flexible to permit the law's adjustment to the needs of various
classes." Proposed Amendments to Constitution, Propositions and Proposed Laws to be
Submitted to the Electors of the State of California at the General Election to be Held
Tuesday, November 6, 1934, Together with Arguments Respecting the Same, at 18. (no
opposing argument presented).
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the list of exemptions. Life insurance companies, pension funds, non-
California state-chartered banks,3" real estate investment trusts, non-
California savings and loan associations, and mortgage bankers were
often excluded from the California market when rates exceeded 10%
per annum.36 These circumstances led many of these lenders to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of California's Usury Law on the basis that
the exemption of some lenders and not others constituted a denial of
equal protection and that the California Usury Law operated to create
an undue burden on interstate commerce, thereby violating both the
equal protection clause37 and the commerce clause3" of the United
States Constitution. In Committee Against Unfair Interest Limitations v.
State,39 the Los Angeles Superior Court upheld the plaintiffs' conten-
tions with respect to commercial loans but concluded that the Usury
Law did not violate the United States Constitution with respect to con-
sumer loans. However, the court stayed the effect of its decision pend-
ing final result on appeal.4° All parties appealed4" and the plaintiffs
subsequently filed a petition for hearing with the California Supreme
Court. Following the enactment of Proposition 2, and at the request of
plaintiffs, the supreme court granted a hearing and dismissed the ap-
peal as moot.
42
The California Supreme Court's dismissal of the Committee case
technically leaves standing the original trial court decision, and thus
the question arises whether the constitutional arguments raised in that
case have any continued validity.43 The weight of authority in Califor-
35. But see Sondeno v. Union Commerce Bank, 71 Cal. App. 3d 391, 139 Cal. Rptr. 299
(1977) (Ohio state chartered bank held to be a "bank" under "Bank Act" within the meaning
of the Usury Law and thus an exempt lender for purposes of certain real estate loans).
36. See generally Curotto, supra note 5.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
38. Id. art. I, § 8.
39. No. C-158433 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Feb. 6, 1978).
40. The trial court judgment held that the decision was "prospective only" and "shall
have no effect" until an "appeal [is] taken and decided and remittitur filed in this Court."
Id
41. On August 2, 1979, the court of appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and
upheld the constitutionality of the California Usury Law. 95 Cal. App. 3d 801, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 543 (1979).
42. No. 31194 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Nov. 29, 1979) (hearing granted and appeal dismissed as
moot). The granting of a petition for hearing automatically vests jurisdiction in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court; thus, the court of appeal opinion is a nullity and will be excised from the
official reports. Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937).
43. Although the trial court decision is apparently now effective, it should not be bind-
ing on borrowers who were not parties to the litigation and it should, therefore, have little
practical effect.
1979]
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nia and elsewhere supports the constitutionality of usury laws44 and the
changes made by Proposition 2 would not seem to add any new consti-
tutional issues. However, the passage of Proposition 2 may not have
rendered all of the issues in the Committee case moot, although the
motivation for a major constitutional challenge may have diminished.
Interest rates remain at extraordinarily high levels and nonexempt
lenders continue to face questions with respect to the effect of the Cali-
fornia Usury Law on their lending activity.45 Nevertheless, it seems
likely that Proposition 2 would survive a constitutional challenge of the
type presented in the Committee case.
II. CHANGES MADE BY PROPOSITION 2
Proposition 2 amends California's Usury Law in several important
respects. First, it distinguishes between loans
46 and forbearances41
made for "personal, family, or household purposes" and all other loans
and forbearances. With respect to loans made by nonexempt lenders
44. See, e.g., Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 (1910) (state may properly establish
classes that are exempt from its usury laws); Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203
P.2d 758 (1949) (equal protection clause does not prevent the legislature from classifying
loans according to size). Recent changes in usury laws have been upheld in several other
states. See, e.g., Cesary v. Second Nat'l Bank, 369 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1979); State v. Spiegel,
Inc., 277 N.W.2d 298 (S.D. Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 100 S. Ct. 25 (1979).
45. These problems are not unique to California. Usury laws have caused problems in
many states, particularly with respect to the financing of the construction and purchase of
residential real property. As a result, Congress has enacted several laws which preempt state
usury laws with respect to certain transactions. The most recent enactment (and the most
significant) is the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 [hereinafter cited as the Depository Institutions Act]. The
Act became effective on April 1, 1980 and is discussed in Section V infra. For other recent
federal legislation that preempts state usury laws with respect to certain loans, see, e.g., Act
of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No, 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233 (similar in many respects to and partially
repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161); Act of Dec. 21, 1979, Pub. L. No, 96-153, 93
Stat. I101 (preempts state usury laws with respect to loans insured under Titles I and II of
the National Housing Act); Veterans Disability Compensation and Survivors Benefits
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-128, 93 Stat. 982 (preempts state usury laws with
respect to certain VA loans); Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557 (com-
monly known as the "Brock Bill" (expired July 1, 1977) and similar in many respects to Pub.
L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233); Veterans Housing Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
324, 90 Stat. 720 (preempts state usury laws with respect to certain FHA and VA loans).
46. A loan is a "contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another, and the latter
agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent to that which he borrowed." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1912 (West 1954).
47. A forbearance is "the act by which a creditor waits for the payment of a debt due
him by the debtor after it has become due." Eisenberg v. Greene, 175 Cal. App. 2d 326, 330,
346 P.2d 60, 63 (1959) (citing Murphy v. Agen, 92 Cal. App. 468, 469, 268 P. 480, 481
(1928)).
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for personal, family, or household purposes, the maximum permissible
rate of interest for written contracts remains at 10% per annum. The
maximum permissible rate of interest on all other loans, however, is the
higher of 10% per annum or 5% per annum over the rate established by
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on advances to member
banks (the "discount rate"). Second, Proposition 2 adds two additional
exemptions: (1) loans made or arranged by licensed real estate brokers
and secured in whole or in part by liens on real property and (2) succes-
sors in interest to exempt loans or forbearances. Third, Proposition 2
expressly grants to the legislature the power to designate additional
classes of exempt lenders.48 Finally, Proposition 2 expressly exempts
the "obligations" of exempt lenders from the restrictions of the Usury
Law. These changes are discussed in detail below.
A. Personal Loans
As noted above, Proposition 2 provides that the maximum permis-
sible rate of interest on any loan or forbearance of money, goods, or
things in action is 10%.per annum if the money, goods, or things in
action "are for use primarily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses" (referred to herein as "personal loans").4 9 Proposition 2 does
not define these terms but does state that loans or forbearances, the
proceeds of which "are used primarily for the purchase, construction or
improvement of real property,"5 are not to be deemed primarily for
"personal, family, or household purposes." Although there is no fur-
48. Proposition 2 provides that "any other class of persons authorized by statute" may
be exempted from its restrictions. See Appendix to this article. This provision will permit
additional exemptions to be added by legislative action whereas formerly such action could
only be effected through an amendment to the California Constitution. Pursuant to this
authority, a bill has been introduced into the legislature to confirm that federal savings and
loan associations are exempt lenders for purposes of California Usury Law. See note 13
supra. It would not appear, however, that the authority granted by Proposition 2 is broad
enough to permit the legislature to make many other changes in the California Usury Law.
Thus, many of the problems and ambiguities of Proposition 2 discussed in this article may
not be susceptible to legislative resolution or clarification.
49. See Appendix to this article. Although the legislative history of Proposition 2 does
not contain any definition of "primarily," it would appear that at least 51% of the proceeds
must be intended to be used for the designated purposes. See Bosko & Larmore, Supra note
10.
50. See Appendix to this article. The maximum permissible interest rate on loans or
forbearances made for the purchase, construction, or improvement of real property (which
should include most conventional home mortgage loans) will then be the greater of 10% per
annum or 5% per annum over the federal discount rate. It should be noted, however, that
included in this exclusion are only those loans the proceeds of which are used for the stated
purposes; the mere fact that a loan is secured by residential or other real property does not
appear to be sufficient to bring it within the terms of the exclusion. Similarly, a loan the
19791
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ther clarification in Proposition 2 of what constitutes a personal loan,
other California statutes with similar language and purpose have con-
sistently used the phrase "for use primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes" to designate consumer transactions and to ex-
clude thereby business or commercial transactions.5'
As a general matter, most personal loans will be readily identifi-
able and lenders will need to be concerned about the possibility of
making personal loans only when the borrowers are individuals, be-
cause it is doubtful that corporations, partnerships, or similar institu-
tional borrowers would use the proceeds for "personal, family, or
household purposes."52 Difficulties in characterization may arise with
respect to loans which are made to individuals for investment purposes.
Some California authority suggests that the use of loan proceeds by an
individual for investment purposes will probably not be considered a
personal loan within the meaning of Proposition 2.
53
The language of Proposition 2 provides that if the loan proceeds
"arefor use primarily" for personal purposes the maximum permissible
rate is 10% per annum. Although this language varies somewhat from
the language of the exception relating to certain real property loans,
which language states that such loans are not personal loans if the pro-
ceeds "are used primarily for" the purchase, construction, or improve-
ment of real property, it seems unlikely that the legislature intended
proceeds of which are used to refinance an existing loan secured by real property would
apparently not be entitled to the higher rate.
51. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 302 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1802.1 (West 1973); CAL. COM. CODE § 9109(1) (West Supp. 1979). See also Morgan v.
Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1968); James Talcott, Inc. v.
Gee, 266 Cal. App. 2d 384, 72 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1968); Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226
(1979). This is consistent with the arguments in favor of Proposition 2 and the analysis
prepared by the legislative analyst contained in the Ballot Pamphlet which refer to nonper-
sonal loans as "nonconsumer" and as being for the purposes of "financing business activity."
California Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 6, 1979).
52. The Consumer Affairs Act, for example, expressly provides that only individuals
may be "consumers" within the meaning of that Act. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 302(c)
(West Supp. 1979). But see Bosko & Larmore, supra note 10 (purpose for which proceeds
are to be used controls, rather than nature of borrower).
53. See Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Pivo, 58 Cal. App. 3d 281, 129 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1976) (indi-
viduals who purchased airplanes for rental to third parties are not consumers within mean-
ing of Unruh Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1801-1812.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979)). Similar
conclusions have been reached by federal courts with respect to the Federal Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601-1667e (West 1974 & Supp. 1979). See Puckett v. Georgia
Homes, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 614, 618-19 (D.S.C. 1974); Adema v. Great N. Dev. Co., 374 F.
Supp. 318, 319-20 (N.D. Ga. 1973). However, loans for investment purposes may not be
"business" loans within the meaning of § 511 of the Depository Institutions Act. See note
292 infra and accompanying text.
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that actual use control with respect to real property loans. Instead, it
seems probable that all loans under Proposition 2 should be character-
ized as personal or nonpersonal in accordance with the intended use of
the proceeds at the time such loans are made, rather than by what later
proves to be the actual use. If the rule were otherwise, it could create
confusion and uncertainty with respect to the validity of the transac-
tion: lenders would be required to monitor the loan for subsequent
changes in use, and borrowers could attempt to change the use in order
to undermine the validity of the transaction and create a defense to
payment. These considerations have led at least one California court to
conclude that, for Uniform Commerical Code purposes, the intended
use at the time of sale rather than any actual later use controls the
designation of goods as consumer or nonconsumer5 4 The conclusion
that the intended, rather than the actual, use of the loan proceeds
should control for purposes of Proposition 2 is also supported by the
principle that if a loan is otherwise valid at its inception, subsequent
voluntary actions by the debtor will not render the loan usurious.
Because the intended use of the loan proceeds will determine
whether any particular loan is a personal loan, it is probably advisable
for a lender to obtain an express representation from the borrower as to
the intended use of the proceeds and an agreement not to use the pro-
ceeds for any other purpose. Such statements may be easily incorpo-
rated into loan application forms or other documents if not already
included on forms currently in use. In the absence of facts which may
put the lender on notice to the contrary, a lender should be justified in
relying on the borrower's statement as to the intended use of the pro-
ceeds.56
54. See Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Pivo, 58 Cal. App. 3d 281, 129 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1976). The
weight of authority in other jurisdictions appears to be in accord with this conclusion. See
Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1225 (1977). However, the Federal Reserve Board appears to have
taken the position that, with respect to the Truth in Lending Act, actual use of the proceeds
controls. Fed. Res. Bd. Letter by Frederic Solomon (Mar. 14, 1969), CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 30,026, at 66,014 (1974). See also CAL. COM. CODE § 9401(3) (West Supp. 1979).
55. See, e.g., Sharp v. Mortgage See. Corp., 215 Cal. 287, 9 P.2d 819 (1932); First Am.
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cook, 12 Cal. App. 3d 592, 90 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1970); Penzer v.
Foster, 170 Cal. App. 2d 106, 338 P.2d 533 (1959); Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Crane, 131 Cal. App.
2d 399, 280 P.2d 590 (1959).
56. Estoppel is a defense to a charge of usury when the borrower acts fraudulently or
when the lender reasonably relies on the borrower's representations that the transaction is
not usurious. See, e.g., Lakeview Meadows Ranch v. Bintliff, 36 Cal. App. 3d 418, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 414 (1973); Buck v. Dahlgren, 23 Cal. App. 3d 779, 99 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1972).
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWA EVIEW [Vol. 13
B. Nonpersonal Loans
1. Determination of Rate-Setting Date
The maximum permissible interest rate under Proposition 2 for
nonpersonal5 7 loans is established as the greater of 10% per annum or
5% per annum over the discount rate58 of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco prevailing on the 25th day of the month preceding the
earlier of (1) the date of execution of the contract to make the loan or
forbearance or (2) the date of making the loan.5 9 The purpose of this
language appears to be to enable lenders (particularly real estate lend-
ers) to determine the rate at the time a commitment is issued rather
than at the time of funding, which may be months or even years later.
Consequently, the parties are permitted to establish the rate at the time
the contract is executed even though the discount rate may change
prior to the funding of the loan.
This language, however, gives rise to a number of questions:
Which document is the "contract" to make the loan? What is the rele-
vant date of execution? If there is no prior agreement, what is the date
of the making of the loan?6" Real estate and commercial loan transac-
57. As used herein, the term "nonpersonal loan" means any loan that is not for "per-
sonal, family, or household purposes," which, as a practical matter, includes most real estate
loans and all business and commercial loans.
58. The language of Proposition 2 refers to "the rate . . . established by the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco on advances to member banks under Sections 13 and 13a of
the Federal Reserve Act." Although historically the rates have been the same, §§ 13 and 13a
do permit the establishment of different rates for different transactions. If different rates are
established, Proposition 2 provides that the California Superintendent of Banks or such
other person or agency as is designated by the legislature shall designate the appropriate rate
for purposes of Proposition 2. See Appendix. On March 17, 1980, the Federal Reserve
Board established a 3% surcharge applicable in certain circumstances to advances and dis-
counts under §§ 13 and 13a to member banks having deposits of $500 million or more. It
would not seem, however, that such surcharge should be included in the discount rate for
California usury purposes unless the Superintendent of Banks so designates. However, the
surcharge is included in determining the effective rate under the recent federal legislation
preempting state usury laws. See notes 45 supra and 286 infra.
59. In the event that the 25th day of the preceding month is not a business day, it would
appear that the appropriate rate may nonetheless be easily determined by reference to the
rate prevailing at the close of business on the next preceding business day, since the discount
rate changes only as the result of affirmative action taken by the Federal Reserve Bank.
Until changed, therefore, the last rate set is the "prevailing" rate. The discount rate is pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank in a publication entitled "Circular 6" which is updated
from time to time when the rate changes by a publication entitled "Supplement 1 to Circular
6." Copies of such publications may be obtained on a regular or an individual basis from
the Federal Reserve Bank.
60. These questions, however, may have little practical significance for loan transactions
in which all relevant events took place in the calendar month since the rate-setting date is
the 25th day of the preceding month. It may also be expected that often there will be only
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tions often involve loan applications, commitment letters, loan agree-
ments, escrow instructions, promissory notes, and security documents,
all of which may bear different dates or be signed by the parties on
different dates. Which of these documents is the "contract" to make
the loan, and how is the relevant date of execution to be determined?
In transactions involving multiple documents, the determination
of which document is the "contract" to make the loan would appear to
depend on the intent of the parties as to when a binding contract
arises.6' If a loan application is "accepted" by a lender, a contract may
arise on the date of such acceptance. On the other hand, many real
estate lenders respond to a loan application by issuing a "commitment
letter" that incorporates the loan application but often adds additional
terms or detail.62 Sometimes the parties may contemplate the prepara-
tion of a loan agreement even though their negotiations have included
the preparation of commitment letters or other correspondence. If the
parties intend that their negotiations and agreements be incorporated
into a formal written loan agreement before either party is bound, a
contract should not arise until the definitive loan agreement is exe-
cuted.63 Subsequent documents, such as escrow instructions, promis-
sory notes, and security instruments, which do not relate to the creation
of the contract but which relate instead to its performance, should not
be controlling. Thus, it would appear that the relevant rate-setting date
for purposes of Proposition 2 should be determined by the date of exe-
cution of the first document which creates a binding agreement. 64 The
one agreement governing the parties' rights, so there will be no need to be concerned about
which document is the contract to make the loan.
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1912 (West 1954) defines a loan of money as a "contract by which
one delivers a sum of money to another, and the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum
equivalent to that which he borrowed." This definition indicates that a loan is a "contract"
but it also states that such contract is one in which the lender "delivers" money to the bor-
rower. Thus it does not appear to distinguish between an executory contract to make a loan
and the actual funding of the loan.
62. In the event the loan commitment letter is incomplete or lacks sufficient detail with
respect to material terms, it may not create a binding contract. See, e.g., Laks v. Coast Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 60 Cal. App. 3d 885, 131 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Grove v. Grove Valve Regulator Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 299, 84 Cal. Rptr. 300
(1970); Stephan v. Maloof, 274 Cal. App. 2d 843, 79 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1969); Louis Lesser
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Roeder, 209 Cal. App. 2d 401, 25 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1962); Woodard v.
Schwartz, 181 Cal. App. 2d 360, 5 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1960).
64. A loan commitment may often be analyzed as an option, since it typically lacks an
undertaking by the debtor to borrow the money. See, e.g., Lowe v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 718, 127 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1976); Torlai v. Lee, 270 Cal. App. 2d 854,
76 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1969). However, for purposes of Proposition 2, it would seem that the
relevant rate-setting date should be determined by the date upon which the lender is bound,
even though the borrower may be free to look elsewhere if he chooses.
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parties, however, should not leave such matters to chance; instead, they
should expressly state which document is intended to be the "contract"
to make the loan.
With respect to determining the date of execution of the contract
to make the loan, California law states that "execution" means not only
"subscribing" it but also delivering it to all persons for whose benefit it
is made. It is not effective until it has been delivered.65 The date of
execution, therefore, should be the date on which it becomes "effec-
tive," ie., the date upon which the final delivery takes place.66 If a
commitment is intended to be effective (ie., binding on the lender)
when accepted by the borrower, the relevant rate-setting date should be
the date upon which the borrower communicates his acceptance to the
lender.67 On the other hand, if the formation of the contract is subject
to some condition precedent, such as the payment of a commitment fee,
the relevant date should be the date upon which such condition is satis-
fied.
A more difficult question is to what extent may the parties control
the rate-setting date by agreement? May they agree that their docu-
ments are effective "as of' a certain date? May they control the rate-
setting date by controlling the date upon which "delivery" is deemed to
take place?6" May they specify the date of funding to be the relevant
rate-setting date notwithstanding the prior execution of a written com-
mitment? This may be particularly important with respect to loans that
may not be funded for months or years after the date of execution of
the commitment. Some institutional lenders, such as life insurance
companies and pension funds, who typically make long term, fixed rate
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1626 (West 1973); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1933 (West 1955).
66. This may create some uncertainty for the parties if the maximum permissible rate
changes after the issuance of the commitment but prior to the "effective date" of the con-
tract. Consequently, lenders may wish to specify that commitments will be accepted in the
same calendar month they were issued, or otherwise control the manner and the time in
which commitments are accepted.
67. It seems likely that the word "execution" in Proposition 2 is intended to be
equivalent to the concept of "acceptance" under contract law. Normally, acceptance of an
offer must be communicated to the offeror by mail or otherwise in order to be effective. See
generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 67 (one vol. ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
CORBIN]. If a commitment letter is viewed as an offer to make a loan, the relevant rate-
setting date should be determined by the date the acceptance is communicated to the lender.
On the other hand, the commitment letter may specify the manner in which acceptance is to
be made, such as by the payment of a commitment fee and the delivery of an executed copy
of the letter to the lender.
68. The concept of delivery normally requires both an act plus an appropriate intent.
See generally CORBIN, supra note 67, at § 244. Thus, the parties may be able to control the
effective date of their agreement by depositing documents in an escrow or by stipulating that
they intend the agreement to be deemed delivered and effective "as of" a specified date.
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loans on improved real property, may desire to use the earlier date as
the rate-setting date. On the other hand, other institutional lenders,
such as banks and savings and loan associations, who make short term,
variable interest rate construction or commercial loans, may desire to
use the funding date as the rate-setting date. Are the parties free to
select the relevant rate-setting date by mutual agreement?
For lenders, borrowers, and their respective counsel, who have
long struggled with an inflexible 10% maximum rate, it is tempting to
believe that the floating maximum rate concept inherent in Proposition
2 evidences a general flexibility with respect to the selection of the rele-
vant rate-setting date. A close reading of Proposition 2, however, dem-
onstrates that such flexibility is probably illusory: the language quite
clearly refers to the "earlier of' the date of execution or the date of
funding. Nevertheless, there are some possible contrary arguments. In
McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,69 decided
prior to the enactment of Proposition 2, the court stated that the parties
could "reasonably agree" that the margin account loans there involved
would bear interest "at a rate which varies in unison with the call-
money rate," Le., the rate at which Merrill Lynch itself borrows money,
and concluded that such agreements may not violate the Usury Law if
entered into in good faith.7" Proposition 2 clearly permits the parties to
use the funding date as the rate-setting date in instances when no prior
written agreement has been executed and it is hard to see why the rule
for written contracts should be more restrictive, especially if the loan
commitment requires the contract rate to change in an identical man-
ner with increases or decreases in the maximum permitted rate71 and if
the commitment is also structured as an option so that the borrower is
not required to borrow if rates increase.72 In addition, the parties could
perhaps argue that the date of "execution" referred to in Proposition 2
means the date upon which the contract becomes "effective" and that
the contract is not "effective" until the occurrence of some predeter-
mined event (such as funding) or until the occurrence of a specified "as
of' date. These arguments, however, may create ambiguities with re-
spect to whether the parties are bound prior to the occurrence of such
events and they seem to ignore the express language of Proposition 2,
69. 21 Cal. 3d 365, 578 P.2d 1375, 146 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1978).
70. Id at 378, 578 P.2d at 1382, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
71. This is consistent with the policy suggested by CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp.
1979) relating to variable interest rate loans to finance the purchase or construction of real
property containing four or fewer residential units. See also McConnell v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 21 Cal. 3d 365, 578 P.2d 1375, 146 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1978).
72. See note 64 supra.
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which refers to the "earlier of' such dates and which, therefore, proba-
bly does not permit such flexibility.
7 3
2. Fixed Rate and Variable Rate Loans
Once the relevant rate-setting date is determined, Proposition 2
provides that the maximum permissible rate for nonpersonal loans will
be the higher of 10% per annum or 5% per annum over the discount
rate "prevailing on the 25th day of the month preceding" such date.
This formula suggests that with respect to any particular loan there is a
single point in time at which the maximum permissible rate will be
established and that, once established, such rate will prevail for the
term of the loan, even though a subsequent decrease in the discount
rate may produce a maximum rate less than the contract rate. This
means that lenders are protected against a subsequent decline in the
maximum permissible rate74 but that they are similarly unable to take
advantage of a subsequent increase.
Interpreting the language of Proposition 2 as requiring a single,
fixed maximum rate should not cause any conceptual difficulties with
respect to fixed rate loans or to variable rate loans which limit the con-
tract rate to such maximum rate. Such an interpretation, however,
raises some questions with respect to variable interest rate loans in
which the parties desire to provide for a "floating" maximum rate, i e.,
a rate that would be limited to the maximum rate permissible from
time to time under Proposition 2. The prior discussion considered
whether the parties should be permitted to control the rate-setting date
by agreement prior to the funding of the loan and pointed out that
Proposition 2 probably does not permit such flexibility. 75 Here the
question arises again: To what extent does Proposition 2 permit the
parties to control such matters in their agreements after funding the
loan?
Initially, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the express
language of Proposition 2 requires the determination of a single, fixed
73. This language should be contrasted with the language of the Depository Institutions
Act which refers to loans "made" after March 31, 1980. Because federal law preempts state
usury laws only if such laws would require a lower rate, the parties should be able to agree
to a loan that bears interest at a rate that does not exceed the greater of the rate permitted on
the date of the commitment or the date of making of the loan. See notes 294-301 infra and
accompanying text.
74. This is consistent with existing law. See, e.g., In re Zemansky, 39 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.
Cal. 1941); First Am. Title & Trust Co. v. Cook, 12 Cal. App. 3d 592, 90 Cal. Rptr. 645
(1970); Cambridge Dev. Co. v. United States Fin., I I Cal. App. 3d 1025, 90 Cal. Rptr. 333
(1970).
75. See notes 68-72 smupra and accompanying text.
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rate and that such rate is effective for the entire term of the loan. 6 This
conclusion has the virtue of not only being simple and easy to apply
but also being consistent with the express language of Proposition 2,
which states that the maximum rate is "the rate prevailing on the 25th
day of the month preceding" the rate-setting date. On the other
hand, one is again tempted to invent interpretations of Proposition 2
that seem more consistent with its implicit purpose of providing a flex-
ible usury law. Because the maximum rate permitted by Proposition 2
for new loans varies from time to time, there seems to be no compelling
policy reason why the parties should not be permitted to agree to a
contract rate that varies directly with changes in the maximum permit-
ted rate.77 In McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. ,78 the court considered how to apply the then fixed 10% limit in the
Usury Law to open ended, variable rate margin account agreements. It
distinguished the rules applicable to fixed rate loans and stated that the
question was "whether an agreement which provides for variable inter-
est which under some contingencies may exceed the constitutional limit
is usurious."7 9 The court noted that the majority of decisions "uphold
the legality" of variable interest agreements if the transactions are con-
summated in good faith without intent to avoid the usury laws and
concluded that "[t]he recognition of the right of the parties to contract
in good faith for a variable-interest rate, even though such a rate may
at times exceed the constitutional maximum, not only finds support in
the weight of authority but also in practical good sense."8
Variable interest rate loans present at least three distinct concep-
tual problems: (1) whether a variable rate loan is usurious at its incep-
tion merely because the contract by its terms does not limit the amount
of interest to be charged and, therefore, the possibility of usury exists;
(2) whether a variable rate loan is usurious merely because the contract
rate may exceed the maximum permitted rate from time to time even
though the average interest rate never exceeds the maximum rate (a
concept often referred to as "spreading"); and (3) whether a variable
rate loan is usurious even if the average interest rate ultimately exceeds
the maximum rate if the parties contracted in good faith and without
intent to violate the Usury Law. The contract in McConnell did not
76. Under this interpretation, it would appear advisable for parties entering into varia-
ble rate loans to acknowledge such upper limit by incorporating a provision in their loan
documents that would expressly limit the contract interest to such maximum rate.
77. See note 71 supra.
78. 21 Cal. 3d 365, 578 P.2d 1375, 146 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1978).
79. Id at 377, 578 P.2d at 1382, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
80. Id at 377-78, 578 P.2d at 1382, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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contain any provision limiting the amount of interest that could be
charged-a fact which apparently troubled the court and influenced its
decision."' The court in McConnell implicitly held that a contract is
not usurious merely because no maximum interest rate is set forth in
the loan agreement. It refused, however, to use the mathematical aver-
age of the interest charged over the term of the loan, stating:
The present case is quite different from those decisions
which established the general rule that interest should be av-
eraged over the full term of the loan; indeed, in the present
context such a rule would prove unworkable. Plaintiffs' mar-
gin account contemplates a credit arrangement of variable in-
terest, of indefinite duration, and fluctuating balance. If
interest were to be averaged over the full term of the loan,
there would be no way to determine whether an existing
credit arrangement were lawful or not; that issue could not be
resolved until the account were closed, and either debtor or
creditor by choosing the right moment to close the account
could cause the interest over the term to exceed lawful rates.
As Arneill Ranch explained (see 64 Cal. App. 3d at p.
293), when an agreement provides for a variable-interest rate,
no agreed total profit to the lender can be averaged over the
entire period of the loan. Under such circumstances, the inter-
estpayablefor each portion of the loan term is the compensation
to the lenderfor hisforbearance from requiring immediate pay-
ment of the princ6oal sum during that specific portion of the
term. Thus the fact that the average interest charge on a vari-
able-rate loan does not exceed the maximum rate is not in
itself sufficient to establish that the loan complies with the
usury laws if the interest charged for a particular period of
forbearance exceeds the legal limit.
8 2
Thus, the McConnell court resolved this apparent difficulty in de-
termining the validity of the interest payable on a variable rate loan by
concluding that each period of time for which the interest rate was ad-
8 1. As the McConnell dissent pointed out, it is difficult to conceive how a loan in which
the average interest rate never exceeded the maximum rate could be usurious. Id at 384,
578 P.2d at 1386, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Clark, J., dissenting). It was stipulated in McConnell
that the average interest rate never exceeded the legal maximum and thus the majority opin-
ion's resort to a subjective "good faith" test, rather than a mathematical test, is troubling
even though the majority also seems to suggest that the average interest rate could exceed
the maximum rate without violating the usury laws, if the parties contracted with the requi-
site good faith. Id at 377, 578 P.2d at 1382, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
82. Id at 376-77, 578 P.2d at 1381-82, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78 (emphasis added).
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justed produced a separate term of forbearance.83 This rationale, that
an adjustment in the interest rate triggers a new period of forbearance,
suggests that the parties to a variable rate loan may be able to specify in
their agreement that a new maximum rate should be applicable to each
such forbearance. Proposition 2 rejects the inflexibility of the fixed
maximum rate of 10% per annum, which had prevailed irrespective of
the rates existing in money markets from time to time, and establishes a
"floating" maximum rate responsive to changes in the cost of funds to
commercial banks. These rates primarily reflect national monetary
policy and are thus clearly outside the control of both lender and bor-
rower, a factor which the court in McConnell found to be significant.84
Nevertheless, even if each change in the interest rate produces a new
period of forbearance, the express language of Proposition 2 suggests
that all such "forbearances" may arise under a single "contract" previ-
ously executed that incorporates a single, maximum rate.
In summary, McConnell indicates that the mere absence of a "cap"
limiting the interest charged to the maximum rate permitted by law will
not render a loan usurious if excessive interest is not actually charged
or collected. In addition, McConnell should not be interpreted as dis-
approving the "spreading" concept, at least when the parties expressly
state in their agreement that the interest charged and collected on
amounts outstanding during the term of the loan is limited to the maxi-
mum amount permitted by law. On the other hand, in the absence of
such a limitation, or in instances in which the interest collected over the
term of the loan actually exceeds the maximum permitted rate, McCon-
nelPs reliance on a "good faith" test is not likely to provide a satisfac-
83. Id at 378, 578 P.2d at 1382, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378. This analysis relies on the deci-
sion in Arneill Ranch v. Petit, 64 Cal. App. 3d 277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1976). Several
commentators have expressed some difficulty with the logic of both the Arneill and McCon-
nell opinions to the extent such opinions rely on the "contingent interest" rule and also
conclude that each change in the rate produces a separate period of forbearance. See Com-
ment, McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.: Variable Rate Loans
Under California's Usury Law, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 621 (1979); Comment, McConnell v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.: New Tests for Variable-Interest Rate Loans, 30
HASTINGs L.J. 1843 (1979). The better rule appears to be that the parties should be able to
designate by contract the period of forbearance and the rate to be charged therefore and so
long as the cumulative, aggregate interest charged on the outstanding balance for such term
never exceeds the maximum permissible rate, the transaction should be free of usury even
though the per diem rate may, at times, exceed the maximum rate. In McConnell and
Arneill, the parties failed to specify contractually the period of forbearance or to limit the
interest charged and the court's analysis appears to be an effort to resolve that uncertainty.
Consequently, if the parties specify such matters in their agreements, McConnell and Arneill
should not be controlling.
84. 21 Cal. 3d at 378, 578 P.2d at 1382, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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tory answer to such questions. Consequently the parties should include
in their loan documents a provision that expressly provides for
"spreading" and limits the interest to be charged over the term of the
loan to the maximum rate permitted, as determined by the applicable
rate-setting date under Proposition 2.
3. Additional Advances and Amendments
Similar questions are raised with respect to loans that contemplate
multiple advances and loans that may be subsequently amended or
modified. With respect to loans contemplating multiple advances, may
the parties agree that the rate for each advance will be determined at
the time of each funding, even though all advances will be made pursu-
ant to a single contract executed prior to the initial funding? Does it
make any difference if the advances are optional rather than obliga-
tory?
Although there do not appear to be any precedents directly on
point, some general observations may be made. First, subsequent obli-
gatory advances should probably be analyzed in the same manner as
variable rate loans. Although there appears to be no compelling policy
reason for prohibiting the parties from designating each advance as a
separate loan and selecting the funding date for each advance as the
relevant rate-setting date, each such advance is likely to be made pur-
suant to a single contract. Consequently, such agreements may be at
variance with the express language of Proposition 2, which requires
that one rate be established at the "earlier of' the funding or the execu-
tion of the contract to make the loan.
Second, loans involving subsequent optional advances may present
a much easier problem because, by definition, there is not likely to be
any prior "contract" to make such advances. Consequently, the parties
should be able to agree that each such advance is a new loan and that
the funding date (or the date upon which the lender agrees to make
such advances) is the relevant rate-setting date. This rationale should
also apply when the parties mutually agree at some later date to amend
or modify the terms of the loan. If the parties desire to adjust the rate
in connection with a subsequent amendment or modification to the
loan, they should be permitted to do so by selecting the effective date of
the amendment as the relevant rate-setting date. Conservative lawyers,
however, are likely to insist that such transactions be structured as a
refinancing of the existing indebtedness to remove all doubt whether
there exists a subsequent "contract" to make a loan or forbearance that
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has been executed after the effective date of Proposition 2.85 So long as
there exists adequate consideration 86 for such an agreement, it should
constitute a subsequent "contract" for a "forbearance" within the
meaning of Proposition 2 thereby permitting the parties to adjust the
interest rate to the then permitted maximum interest rate.87
C Obligations of Exempt Entities
Proposition 2 modifies the language of former section 1 of article
15 of the California Constitution with respect to the exemptions con-
tained therein by providing that "none of the above restrictions shall
apply to any obligations of, loans made by, or forbearances of, any" of
the enumerated exempted entities.88 Former section 1 simply provided
that "none of the above restrictions shall apply to any" of the enumer-
ated exempted entities. The prior formulation was arguably ambigu-
ous as to whether the enumerated entities were exempt solely in their
capacity as lenders or whether they were also exempt in their capacity
as borrowers. The possible ambiguity caused some concern among
financial institutions as to its effect on certificates of deposit or other
debt instruments issued when market conditions required rates in ex-
cess of 10% per annum.89 Assuming, arguendo, that such certificates of
deposit are "loans or forbearances" within the meaning of Proposition
2, the addition of the phrase "obligations of' appears to make it clear
that any obligation issued by an exempted financial institution, includ-
ing a certificate of deposit or other debt security, is not subject to the
Usury Law.9" In addition, the Depository Institutions Act specifically
85. See, e.g., Lakeview Meadows Ranch v. Bintliff, 36 Cal. App. 3d 418, 111 Cal. Rptr.
414 (1973); Brown v. Cardoza, 67 Cal. App. 2d 187, 153 P.2d 767 (1944).
86. Examples of such consideration might include the advancement of additional funds,
the extension of the maturity date, a change in the amortization rate, or modification of
other material covenants in the agreement.
87. Similar questions arise under the Depository Institutions Act. See notes 282-283
infra and accompanying text.
88. See Appendix (emphasis added).
89. In 1974, during a period in which interest rates on certificates of deposit were in
excess of 10%, Congress made any possible problem moot by enacting preemptive legislation
which in essence prohibited banks, savings and loan associations and their affiliates from
raising the defense of usury with respect to such obligations. This legislation was commonly
known as the "Brock Bill," which expired on July 1, 1977. See Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557. The Depository Institutions Act contains similar provisions. See
notes 304-308 infra and accompanying text.
90. Although strict grammatical construction of this section may give rise to an argu-
ment that the exemption relating to obligations does not apply to each of the enumerated
entities, there is no persuasive reason to construe the section in such a fashion. Proposition 2
reads in pertinent part:
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
preempts state usury laws with respect to obligations issued by specified
financial institutions. Thus, there seems to be no need for any further
concern with respect to whether such obligations are subject to any
state interest rate limitations.
D. Loans by Licensed Real Estate Brokers
Proposition 2 adds to the list of exemptions from the restrictions of
the Usury Law "any loans made or arranged by any person licensed as
a real estate broker by the State of California and secured in whole or
in part by liens on real property." Although this exemption seems very
broad, it is likely that it includes only such loans as are made or ar-
ranged by persons who are in fact licensed as real estate brokers under
California law and that it does not include loans made or arranged by
persons who may be otherwise permitted by law to engage in some or
all of the activities of a real estate broker without being required to
obtain a license.91 Restricting the exemption to real estate brokers ac-
However, none of the above restrictions shall apply to any obligations of,
loans made by, or forbearance of, any building and loan association. . ., or to any
. . . industrial loan companies, . . . or any. . . credit unions, . . . or any duly
licensed pawnbroker or personal property broker, or any loans made or arranged
by any person licensed as a real estate broker. . ., or any bank. . . or any [desig-
nated agricultural lenders]. . ., or any other class of persons authorized by statute,
or to any successor in interest to any loan or forbearance exempted under this
article ....
It is apparent from a review of the quoted language that the grammatical continuity of
the sentence is broken twice: once by the inclusion of "to" prior to "industrial loan compa-
nies" and a second time by the inclusion of the phrase "any loans made or arranged" by
licensed real estate brokers. A strict grammatical construction would argue in the first in-
stance that the phrase "obligations of, loans made by, or forbearance of' applies only to
building and loan associations, and in the second that this phrase applies only to the entities
preceding licensed real estate brokers. Such a restrictive construction, however, would ap-
pear to thwart, at least in part, the apparent intent of the California legislature in including
such language. In addition, it does not further any discernible purpose of the Usury Law.
Consequently, a court should construe the exemptive language relating to obligations, loans,
and forbearances to apply to each of the enumerated entities.
91. Included in this latter group are finders, see, e.g., Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 507
P.2d 65, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1973); Zappas v. King Williams Press, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 768,
89 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1970), persons acting for their own account, attorneys and certain
fiduciaries, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10133 (West 1964), and certain specified lenders, id
§ 10133.1 (West Supp. 1979). In general, the list of lenders who are not required under
§ 10133.1 to obtain real estate brokers' licenses is the same as the list of exempt lenders
contained in Proposition 2.
With respect to the exemptions contained in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10133.1, it
should be noted that although § 10133.1 exempts "[a]ny person or employee thereof doing
business under any law of [California], any other state, or of the United States relating to
banks, trust companies, savings and loan associations, industrial loan companies, pension
trusts, credit unions, or insurance companies" from licensing requirements arising out of
their real estate lending activities, it does not exempt non-employee authorized representa-
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tually licensed by the California Department of Real Estate is consis-
tent not only with the language of Proposition 2 but also with the
rationale underlying the exemptions-that borrowers do not need the
protection of usury laws with respect to exempted lenders who are
otherwise subject to special regulation under California law.92
The exemption for loans "made" by a licensed real estate broker
seems self-explanatory: the broker should act as a principal and ad-
vance the broker's own funds.93 Subsequent transfers or assignments
of such loans should be governed by the exemption for "successors in
interest" discussed below.94 The exemption for loans "arranged by"
licensed real estate brokers may be more difficult to define. On its face,
this exemption seems so broad that it may be subject to possible abuse.
As a result, minimal involvement in a loan transaction by a licensed
real estate broker may not necessarily be sufficient to exempt the loan
from the restrictions of Proposition 2. To be consistent with the protec-
tives, agents, or loan correspondents of such lenders. Authorized representatives, agents,
and loan correspondents are required to be licensed, although they are exempted from cer-
tain other regulations relating to transactions in trust deeds, real property sales contracts and
securities, and real property loans. See id § 10133.15.
92. See, e.g., Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949); In re
Fuller, 15 Cal. 2d 425, 102 P.2d 321 (1940). Real estate brokers are not only required to be
licensed by the California Real Estate Commissioner but are also subject to regulation by
such Commissioner with respect to other aspects of their business activities as well. See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10130-10148, 10230-10236.1 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979); CAL.
ADMIN. CODE, Title 10, § 2700 et seq. (April 16, 1977). Such regulations may apply, how-
ever, only if the broker is performing acts for which a license is required. See Buccella v.
Mayo, 102 Cal. App. 3d 315, - Cal. Rptr. - (1980).
93. The California Attorney General has apparently concluded that the broker must
also be acting as a licensee, ie., performing an act for which a license is required. See Ops.
Cal. Att'y Gen. No. 80-122 (April 29, 1980). His concern is apparently based on the premise
that if the rule were otherwise, a licensed broker could escape all regulation merely by
claiming he is acting as a principal. See Buccella v. Mayo, 102 Cal. App. 3d 315, - Cal.
Rptr. - (1980). Although his concern is understandable, his reasoning seems somewhat
circular and confusing. How can a broker act both as a principal and as a licensee, ie., as an
agent for others? By stating that such a loan by the broker must be made "within the scope
and course of such license," does the Attorney General intend that the broker must be in-
volved in some other aspect of the transaction, such as the sale of real property? If the
purpose of the Attorney General's opinion is merely to make sure that certain regulations,
e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10176, 10177, 10241, 10242 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980) are
applicable to such activities, the better view seems to be to request the legislature to exercise
the authority granted to it under Proposition 2 to enact appropriate legislation regulating
loans made by licensed real estate brokers.
94. See notes 116-141 infra and accompanying text. Mortgage bankers who are licensed
as real estate brokers often fund loans in their own name and with their own money but
pursuant to a prearranged commitment to sell concurrently such loans to a non-exempt in-
vestor. Under such circumstances there may be a question whether the loan was "made" by
the mortgage banker or whether it was arranged by him. In either case, however, the loan
should be exempt if it otherwise complies with the requirements of Proposition 2.
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tive purposes of Proposition 2 and in keeping with the rationale under-
lying the exemptions, it appears that in order to qualify as an exempt
transaction the real estate broker who arranges a loan should be acting
as a licensee, that is, performing a function for which a license is re-
quired under the California Business and Professions Code.95 Section
10131 of that Code defines a real estate broker as
a person who, for a compensation or in expectation of a com-
pensation, does or negotiates to do one or more of the follow-
ing acts for another or others:96
(d) Solicits borrowers or lenders for or negotiates loans
or collects payments or performs services for borrowers or
lenders or note owners in connection with loans secured di-
rectly or collaterally by liens on real property or on a business
opportunity.
(e) Sells or offers to sell, buys or offers to buy or ex-
changes or offers to exchange a real property sales contract, or
a promissory note secured directly or collaterally by a lien on
real property or on a business opportunity, and performs serv-
ices for the holders thereof.
97
Courts have distinguished those functions which come within the
scope of section 10131 from those which do not require licensing. They
have consistently held that considerations of competency and integrity
require that individuals who participate in negotiations and who are
otherwise actively involved in helping to consummate real estate trans-
actions (including real estate loan transactions) must be licensed as bro-
kers and be otherwise subject to the regulations of the Department of
Real Estate.98 Only "finders," Le., those persons who merely introduce
95. The California Attorney General has reached a similar conclusion. See note 93
supra.
96. Persons who are licensed as real estate brokers and who make or arrange loans in the
ordinary course of their employment but who are salaried employees and not specifically
compensated for such loans on a transactional basis would nonetheless appear to be acting
"for a compensation or in expectation of a compensation" within the meaning of § 10131.
Such language does not appear to be intended to require that a broker receive compensation
on a loan-by-loan basis but, rather, it appears to be intended to exclude transactions in
which persons act for their own account rather than as agents of others. See Williams v.
Kinsey, 74 Cal. App. 2d 583, 169 P.2d 487 (1946); 32 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 210 (1958).
97. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10131 (West Supp. 1979).
98. See, e.g., Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 507 P.2d 65, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1973);
Zappas v. King Williams Press, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 768, 89 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1970); Evans v.
Riverside Int'l Raceway, 237 Cal. App. 2d 666, 47 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1965); Williams v. Kinsey,
74 Cal. App. 2d 583, 169 P.2d 487 (1946). As a matter of practice, in transactions in which
the parties are relying on the licensed real estate brokers' exemption, it would appear advisa-
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interested parties and who do not participate in the transaction in any
way, are free of regulation.99 Under such circumstances, it is doubtful
that a finder could be said to have "arranged" a loan.
How much involvement by a licensed real estate broker is re-
quired? Must the broker be retained by the borrower to negotiate on
his behalf? If he acts as an agent for or employee of the lender or as an
independent contractor, is the loan still entitled to the usury exemp-
tion? The purpose of usury laws is to protect borrowers, 00 and the
advice and assistance of a licensed real estate broker may be of sub-
stantial benefit to a borrower, especially with respect to a loan that
might otherwise be classified as a personal loan. When engaged by
borrowers to arrange loans on their behalf, real estate brokers have
been held to be agents and, therefore, to be subject to fiduciary obliga-
tions.'01 A recent California decision indicates that these obligations
include certain affirmative disclosure requirements. In Wyatt v. Union
Mortgage Co. ,102 the California Supreme Court held that general prin-
ciples of agency and the statutory duties of licensed real estate brokers
imposed on the broker-defendant an obligation to make a full and ac-
curate disclosure of the terms of the loan, which obligation extended
beyond mere delivery of the loan documents to the borrower. 0 3 How-
ever, there is nothing in the language of Proposition 2 or in its legisla-
tive history that suggests that the broker must be an agent of the
borrower or that the usury exemption depends on technical principles
of agency law. Other exempt lenders are not subject to any special
fiduciary obligations and there seems to be no logical reason to impose
such a duty on all loans "arranged" by licensed real estate brokers. In
ble to preserve evidence of the broker's license and the broker's involvement in the transac-
tion.
99. See note 91 supra.
100. See, ag., Buck v. Dahlgren, 23 Cal. App. 3d 779, 100 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1972); Wooten
v. Coerber, 213 CaL App. 2d 142, 28 CaL Rptr. 635 (1963).
101. See, e.g., Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 507 P.2d 65, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1973);
Rattray v. Scudder, 28 CaL 2d 214, 169 P.2d 371 (1946); Zappas v. King Williams Press, Inc.,
10 Cal. App. 3d 768, 89 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1970).
102. 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1979).
103. In the Wyatt case, the broker had published misleading advertisements and had
made oral misrepresentations to the borrowers as to the terms of a possible loan. After the
borrowers decided to obtain a loan from the broker, the broker provided the borrowers with
all required documents that contained the actual terms of the loan. The borrowers eventu-
ally defaulted on the loan and sued the broker and certain affiliates, including a controlling
shareholder and certain officers, to recover compensatory and punitive damages based on
breach of fiduciary obligations. The court found that the broker's conduct did not satisfy the
broker's fiduciary obligations of disclosure and good faith toward the borrowers because
they "extend beyond bare written disclosure of the terms of a transaction to duties of oral
disclosure and counseling." Id at 738, 598 P.2d at 51, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
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mortgage loan transactions, brokers often render services to both bor-
rowers and lenders by preparing loan applications, appraisals, and
other documents, by handling the escrow and closing, and by servicing
the loan following the funding by the lender.' °4
On the other hand, California's usury policy seems to be based on
the premise that borrower protection is best supplied not by regulating
interest rates but by regulating the persons or entities engaged in the
money lending business. Such lenders are subject to licensing proce-
dures and other state regulations. 10 5 However, with respect to loans
"arranged" by licensed real estate brokers, the lenders may be totally
unregulated. Under such circumstances, will the licensing and regula-
tion of the broker provide adequate protection? How much involve-
ment of the broker is necessary to establish the usury exemption? The
logical answer should be that the degree of the broker's involvement
and the extent of his fiduciary duty to the borrower should vary with
the borrower's need for advice and assistance. 106 Viewed in this light,
the Wyatt case suggests that an agency relationship with the borrower
may be important with respect to personal loans when the borrower
may not have counsel available or when the borrower may be unso-
phisticated or inexperienced. However, a formal agency relationship
with the borrower should not be required with respect to establishing
the exemption for other loans. The requirement that real estate brokers
be licensed and remain subject to substantial regulation of their activi-
ties seems sufficient to justify the usury exemption for such loans. Bro-
kers who abuse their responsibilities are, like other exempt lenders,
subject to possible discipline and further regulation. 10 7 However, even
in commercial loan transactions, some involvement by the broker
seems necessary in order to ensure that the loan has been "arranged
by" the broker. In such transactions, the broker's involvement should
perhaps include at least some of the following activites: (1) "qualify-
ing" the borrower, Le., determining whether the borrower has counsel
available or is otherwise sufficiently experienced and sophisticated to
protect himself; (2) preparing the loan application and participating to
104. Guyselman v. Ramsey, 179 Cal. App. 2d 802, 4 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1960). Brokers may
have responsibilities to lenders as well as borrowers. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 10230-10236.1 (West 1964).
105. See Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. No. 80-122 (April 29, 1980).
106. An analogy might be made to certain provisions of the securities laws in which cer-
tain requirements are not applicable to transactions involving sophisticated investors. See,
e.g., the "safe harbor" rules set forth in 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1979).




some extent in the negotiations; (3) ensuring that all required disclo-
sures have been made; and (4) delivering or causing to be delivered to
the borrower a closing statement and a complete set of loan docu-
ments. 
10 8
Proposition 2 not only requires that exempt loans be made or ar-
ranged by licensed real estate brokers but also that the loans be secured
"in whole or in part" by real property. The legislative history of Propo-
sition 2 does not furnish any guidance as to the appropriate percentage
of the total value of the collateral that the real property security must
constitute so that the loan is secured "in part" by real property within
the meaning of Proposition 2. An analogy can perhaps be made to the
lending activities of licensed personal property brokers. 109 In order for
a loan to "qualify" as a personal property broker loan, such loan must
be secured "in whole or in part" by personal property and, although
there is no direct authority, it has generally been assumed that the
value of the personal property security for the loan should be at least
20-25% of the principal amount of the loan.'10 It seems logical to con-
clude that a similar rule should apply to real property security and that
so long as such security is taken in good faith, the loan should qualify
for the usury exemption."1 '
One final concern relating to the exemption for licensed real estate
brokers is the continued effectiveness of certain statutory provisions
that restrict the maximum rate of interest on certain loans negotiated or
made by such brokers to 10% per annum. Section 10242(c) of the Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code provides that no loan negotiated
by a broker, which is to be secured by a first lien on real property in a
principal amount of less than $20,000 or a junior lien in a principal
amount of less than $10,000, may provide for the "payment of interest
in excess of ten percent (10%) per year as provided by Section 1 of
108. Some of these duties are already imposed on brokers with respect to certain loans.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10240-10248.9 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979).
109. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22000 et seq. (West 1968).
110. Id § 22009; Budget Fin. Plan v. Gamson, 34 Cal. 2d 95, 207 P.2d 825 (1949). See
also Riebe v. Budget Fin. Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 576, 70 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1968). A subse-
quent release of the statutorily required security, if done in good faith and for a bona fide
reason, would not appear to render the transaction usurious. See generally Sharp v. Mort-
gage Sec. Corp., 215 Cal. 289,9 P.2d 819 (1932); Knoll v. Schleussner, 112 Cal. App. 2d 876,
247 P.2d 370 (1952); Goldenzwig v. Shaddock, 31 Cal. App. 2d 719, 88 P.2d 933 (1939);
Penziner v. West Am. Fin. Co., 133 Cal. App. 578, 74 P.2d 252 (1933).
111. Lenders and real estate brokers may wish to preserve evidence of the value of the
real property security in the form of appraisals, assessed value for tax purposes, or other
appropriate materials.
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Article XV of the California Constitution." 112 Similarly, the California
Real Estate Commissioner has promulgated regulation 2845, which
provides that no broker may make a loan that is to be secured by real
property at an interest rate in excess of 10% per annum.
113
This statute and regulation, insofar as they restrict the interest rate
on loans made or arranged by licensed real estate brokers to 10% per
annum, appear to be in clear conflict with legislative statements of pur-
pose relating to Proposition 2. Both the analysis prepared by the Legis-
lative Analyst and the arguments in favor of Proposition 2 contained in
the Ballot Pamphlet make specific references to loans made or arranged
by licensed real estate brokers. 1 4 The interest rate limitations con-
tained in section 10242(c) and in regulation 2845 are inconsistent with
the exemption of licensed real estate brokers contained in Proposition 2
and, as such, should be deemed to be implicitly repealed by the enact-
ment of Proposition 2.1 15 However, until this conclusion has been con-
firmed by judicial decision or legislative action, brokers and lenders
112. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10242(c) (West Supp. 1979).
113. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Title 10, § 2845 (Dec. 15, 1973).
114. In pertinent part, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst states:
Under existing law, loans made or arranged by any person licensed as a real
estate broker by the State of California and secured in whole or in part by liens on
real property are subject to a 10 percent interest rate ceiling. Such loans commonly
are made by mortgage brokers and mortgage bankers. Under this measure such
loans would be exempt from the constitutional limitations on interest rates that
may be charged.
California Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 6, 1979) at 10. Similarly, the proponents of Proposition 2
argued that:
Because 10 percent is not enough today, many lenders no longer lend money
in California (although others who are now exempt from the Usury Law still do).
For example, mortgage bankers, who last year provided $13 billion for housing
loans in California, are limited to a 10 percent rate and in 1979 have practically
abandoned providing conventional mortgage loans.
Because sometimes we all need money, we need to remove outdated limita-
tions on the availability of that money. Vote "YES" on Proposition 2.
California Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 6, 1979) at 12.
115. See, eg., Nuckolls v. Bank of Cal., 10 Cal. 2d 266, 74 P.2d 264 (1937); Penziner v.
West Am. Fin. Co., 10 CaL 2d 160, 74 P.2d 252 (1937); Gardiner v. Bank of Napa, 160 Cal.
577, 177 P. 667 (1911); Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. No. 80-122 (April 29, 1980). Although the
legislature has the express authority to regulate exempted lenders under Proposition 2, in-
cluding the rate of interest that may be charged, it is difficult to argue that § 10242(c) and
regulation 2845 evidence such an intention and are therefore not inconsistent with Proposi-
tion 2 for three reasons: first, these provisions were enacted prior to the passage of Proposi-
tion 2; second, such an argument appears to be in direct conflict with the stated intention of
the legislature with respect to Proposition 2; and third, the reference to § I of article 15 of the
California Constitution in § 10241(c) indicates that the statutory provision was intended
merely to reflect the limitations on brokers contained in the constitution rather than to regu-
late such brokers independently of the constitution.
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should be aware of the potential conflict between these provisions and
Proposition 2.
E. Sales By or Partipations With Exempt Lenders. The Exempt
Status of Successors In Interest
Proposition 2 also provides that the usury restrictions shall not ap-
ply to "any successor in interest to any loan or forbearance exempted
under this article." Prior to the enactment of Proposition 2, there was
some uncertainty with respect to the extent to which nonexempt inves-
tors could participate with or purchase loans from exempt lenders. The
uncertainty was created because it could be contended that only ex-
empt lenders could receive interest in excess of the maximum rate or
that the involvement of the nonexempt investor created a loan directly
from such investor to the borrower. The question is important because
the secondary mortgage market is of enormous significance in that it
involves billions of dollars annually, enables California exempt lenders
to maintain liquidity and stability, and encourages additional invest-
ment in California." 6 Although it was generally assumed that such
secondary market transactions were valid, until recently there was little
direct authority upholding their validity." 7
1. Sales of Promissory Notes
With respect to the sale of promissory notes by exempt lenders to
nonexempt lenders, most lawyers and institutional lenders breathed a
little more easily after the decision in Strike v. Trans- West Discount
Corp. I"' In that case, the sale of a note by an exempt lender to a non-
exempt lender was expressly upheld against a claim of usury. The
plaintiff in Strike borrowed $105,000 from Barclays Bank, a California
state-chartered bank. The note evidencing the loan carried an interest
116. [T]he passage of Proposition 2 can not be underestimated as a factor in shoring
up the secondary money market. . . [a] financing mechanism used to funnel dol-
lars from capital surplus to capital short areas around the country. The [existence
of the secondary market] . . . permits a conventional lender, such as a savings
association, to lend money to home buyers even though its own net savings are
weak, by virtue of selling off a portion of those mortgage loans to an institution
L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1980, Part IX, at 14, col. 1.
117. Secondary market transactions may also take the form of loans by investors to ex-
empt lenders secured by a portion of the exempt lender's portfolio of loans. In such in-
stances, the interest rate on the underlying loans should be irrelevant and it is the yield on
the funds advanced to the exempt lender that may raise a usury question. This problem,
however, has apparently been resolved by the addition of the language in Proposition 2
relating to "obligations" of exempt lenders. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
118. 92 Cal. App. 3d 735, 155 Cal. Rptr. 132, appeal dismissed, 100 S. Ct. 417 (1979).
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rate of 11% per annum and was secured by a deed of trust on a resi-
dence owned by Strike. The note was eventually purchased by Trans-
West, a nonexempt lender.
Strike defaulted under certain obligations owing to Trans-West,
and Trans-West instituted foreclosure proceedings on the real property
securing the Barclays note. Strike brought suit to enjoin the foreclo-
sure, contending, among other things, that the receipt by Trans-West of
11% interest under the Barclays note constituted usury. Although
Trans-West held a personal property brokers license, the court appar-
ently concluded that the license was not sufficient to shelter the real
estate loan that Trans-West acquired from Barclays. Nevertheless,
judgment was given for Trans-West in the trial court and Strike ap-
pealed.
The court of appeal rejected Strike's contention that the receipt of
11% interest on the Barclays note by Trans-West was usurious. The
court first noted that Strike offered no authority "for the proposition
that the assignee of an exempt lender becomes thereby a usurer unable
to collect any interest.""' 9 The court then noted that Strike's conten-
tion, if upheld, would effectively prohibit the sale of notes by exempt
lenders and was contrary to the public policy expressed in the constitu-
tional exemption afforded exempt lenders in California. 20 The court
concluded by referring to the general rule that usury is to be deter-
mined on the basis of facts in existence at the inception of the loan or
forbearance; a subsequent event, such as a sale of the loan, is irrele-
vant.
12 1
The finding that a nonexempt purchaser of a loan carrying an in-
terest rate in excess of 10% per annum originated by an exempt lender
is logically sound and is supported by prior decisional law even though
the court in Strike did not discuss such law in detail. 122 The language
119. Id at 745, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
120. Id
121. Id Seealso Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21 Cal. 3d 37, 577 P.2d 200, 145 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); Sharp v. Mortgage Sec. Corp. of America, 215 Cal. 287, 9 P.2d 819 (1932); Cam-
bridge Dev. Co. v. United States Fin., I1 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 90 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1970); Knoll
v. Schleussner, 112 Cal. App. 2d 876, 247 P.2d 370 (1952); Goldenzwig v. Shaddock, 31 Cal.
App. 2d 719, 88 P.2d 933 (1939); Grail v. San Diego Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 127 Cal. App. 250,
15 P.2d 797 (1932).
122. See, e.g., O.A. Graybeal Co. v. Cook, 111 Cal. App. 518, 535, 295 P. 1088, 1094
(1931) (payment of bonus and commission by maker of existing note to induce certain per-
sons to purchase it from the holder thereof was not interest for usury purposes because the
transaction between such purchasers and the maker was not a loan); Smith v. Cavaglieri
Mortgage Co., 111 Cal. App. 136, 141, 295 P. 366, 368 (1931) (after negotiable instrument
has once been validly negotiated by transfer upon valuable consideration, it becomes article
of commerce and can be bought and sold as freely as any other property).
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of Proposition 2 concerning "successors in interest" confirms the deci-
sion in Strike and should put to rest any concern about the validity of
such transactions.
Strike, however, involved the purchase of a loan several years af-
ter its original funding by the exempt lender, Barclays. To what extent
may a purchase be prearranged? May it occur concurrently, or nearly
so, with the original funding by the exempt lender? Although there is
no direct authority involving exempt lenders, the recent California
Supreme Court decision in Boerner v. Colwell Co. 123 suggests that even
prearranged transactions may be valid if they are entered into with
good faith and without intent to violate the usury laws. In Boerner, the
Colwell Company, a mortgage banking firm, entered into a series of
financing agreements with a number of contractors who were in the
business of constructing vacation homes and making home improve-
ments. When a customer of the contractors desired financing, the cus-
tomer and the contractor completed a "purchase contract" and credit
application on Colwell forms. Colwell ordered the preliminary title re-
port and approved the customer's credit. The customer then executed a
note and deed of trust on Colwell forms and the contractor assigned
both to Colwell, again, on a Colwell form. The Colwell notes typically
exacted interest rates in excess of 10% per annum, and several custom-
ers instituted a class action seeking a determination that Colwell's notes
exacted usurious rates of interest.
Colwell defended primarily on the ground that the so-called
"time-price doctrine" removed its dealings with plaintiffs from the pur-
view of the Usury Law. The time-price doctrine holds essentially that a
seller of property may elect to sell for cash at one price or to sell on
credit for a higher price. The difference between the cash sale price
and the credit sale price is often referred to as the "time-price differen-
tial" or as a "finance charge" and, from an economic standpoint, prob-
ably represents interest on the unpaid balance of ihe purchase price.
Nonetheless, it has long been the rule in California and in most other
states that such credit sales are beyond the ambit of usury laws.'24
Plaintiffs conceded that, absent the involvement of Colwell, no
charge of usury could have been asserted against the contractor be-
123. 21 Cal. 3d 37, 577 P.2d 200, 145 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
124. Id at 45-47, 577 P.2d at 204-06, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86. See Milana v. Credit
Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945); Wilson v. J.E. French Co., 214 Cal. 188, 4
P.2d 537 (1931); Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal. 557, 261 P. 1017 (1927). Indeed, as the holding
in Boerner clearly demonstrates, the unpaid purchase price may be incorporated into a
promissory note and the time-price differential may be expressed as an interest rate without
creating any usury problems so long as the obligation arises out of a bona fide sale.
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cause of the time-price doctrine. Accordingly, plaintiffs contended that
Colwell's intimate involvement in the transaction transformed what
would otherwise have been a bona fide credit sale by the contractors
into a loan by Colwell. The California Supreme Court disagreed and
found that the close connection between Colwell and the contractors
was "without significance" in determining whether Colwell's purchase
of the installment contracts amounted to a loan.1
25
The principal factor to which the supreme court ascribed signifi-
cance was that the trial court found that bona fide credit sales had oc-
curred and that Colwell had acted in good faith. 26 The California
Supreme Court took note of the fact that the contractor assigned to
Colwell the lien contract and the deed of trust with various warranties,
including the warranty that there were no defenses to the validity of the
contract. The contractor further agreed to repurchase the note in the
event of misrepresentation or breach of warranty. 27 At the time of
trial, the Boerner lien contract and deed of trust had been reassigned to
the builder under the assignment warranty provisions. 2 The supreme
court refused to disturb the trial court's findings with respect to the
bona fides of the credit sales and Colwell's good faith and did not
otherwise explain what it meant by "good faith."
Certainly, had plaintiffs independently sought credit directly from
Colwell, the finance charges would have been held usurious. Equally
certain, had the contractors financed the purchases themselves, and
later, in a completely independent transaction, sold the time-price pa-
per to Colwell, no usury would have resulted. It is difficult to perceive
how Colwell's "good faith" could vary from one situation to the other.
Nonetheless, the trial court (and the supreme court) evidently viewed
Colwell's supplying of forms to the contractors and purchase of the
time-price paper concurrently with the execution thereof as being moti-
125. 21 Cal. 3d at 53, 577 P.2d at 210, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 390. It should be noted that the
decision in Boerner was 4-3; thus some caution may be appropriate with respect to fact
situations that differ from those in Boerner.
126. The "good faith" test was one of the primary factors which enabled the court to
distinguish its prior decision in Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d 915,
528 P.2d 357, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1974). The court contrasted the facts in Glaire, in which
the time-price differential was "buried" in the form of an undisclosed discount on the sale of
the installment contract to a financial institution, with the facts in Boerner, in which proper
disclosures were apparently made and the trial court expressly found that the parties' deal-
ings were in good faith. 21 Cal. 3d at 52, 577 P.2d at 209, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
127. 21 Cal. 3d at 42 n.3, 577 P.2d at 202 n.3, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.3.
128. Id at 43 n.5, 577 P.2d at 203 n.5, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.5.
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vated by legitimate business needs and, therefore, in good faith. 129
If Colwell's prearrangement with the contractor with respect to the
purchase of installment contracts is irrelevant to the determination of
"good faith," what is relevant? The only logical conclusion is that
"good faith" is not tested solely by Colwell's intent, but instead by ref-
erence to the intent of the other parties to the transaction. 130 Certainly,
plaintiffs intended to buy and the contractors intended to sell, on an
installment basis, the home improvements and vacation homes. The
interjection of Colwell into the transaction simply facilitated its con-
summation. Thus, Coiwell's "good faith" may in large part have de-
rived from the bona fides of the underlying transaction.
The essence of the holding in Boerner is that the original transac-
tion between the contractor and the customer was not a loan and its
characterization was not affected by a subsequent assignment to a third
party, such as Colwell. The sale of a promissory note held by an ex-
empt lender, however, clearly involves an original loan transaction be-
tween the exempt lender and the borrower. Is this a material
difference? May the parties, based on the rationale of Boerner, rely on
the bona fides of the underlying transaction with the exempt lender? If
the notes assigned or sold are negotiable instruments, could it be con-
tended that the transaction is exempt because the transferee of such a
note is a "holder in due course?"'' It is well established in California
that usury is a personal defense that is not available against a holder in
due course. 132 Whether the purchaser of a note is a holder in due
course turns upon whether the purchaser holds such a note in good
129. The role of the financing institution in transactions of this kind is basically a
beneficial one, for the essence of their function is that of providing needed financial
assistance to sellers unable to handle their own consumer financing, thus permit-
ting those sellers to compete on a more equal footing with their more established
competitors.
Id. at 53, 577 P.2d at 211, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
130. In Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d 915, 528 P.2d 357, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 541, it was alleged that the seller of the health club membership and the assignee of the
membership contract were "interlocking corporations with common ownership and con-
trol," a fact which apparently influenced the court's decision. Id at 918, 528 P.2d at 359, 117
Cal. Rptr. at 543. On the other hand, in Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21 Cal. 3d 37, 577 P.2d 200,
145 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), the developers and Colwell were clearly independent companies.
Thus, Colwell was able to benefit from the bona fide nature of the underlying transactions.
131. CAL. COM. CODE § 3104 (West 1964).
132. See, e.g., Nuckolls v. Bank of Cal., 10 Cal. 2d 278, 74 P.2d 271 (1937); Brown v.
Guaranty Mortgage Co., 220 Cal. 532, 31 P.2d 788 (1934); Liebelt v. Carney, 213 Cal. 250, 2
P.2d 144 (1931); Szczotka v. Idelson, 228 Cal. App. 2d 399, 39 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964); Ander-
son v. Lee, 103 Cal. App. 2d 24, 228 P.2d 613 (1951); Baker v. Butcher, 106 Cal. App. 358,
289 P. 236 (1930).
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faith and without notice of any defense against it.'33 On the one hand,
because the loans, when made by the exempt lender, are clearly not
subject to a claim of usury, it is arguable that a purchaser takes the
notes in good faith and without notice of any defense against the notes.
This is consistent with the principle that usury is determined at the time
the loan is made. 34 On the other hand, a purchaser will certainly be
charged with knowledge of its status as a nonexempt lender, the exempt
status of the original lender, and the interest rate on the notes. Upon
this ground, one could argue that when a purchaser holds a note having
an interest rate in excess of the legal rate, the purchaser does not take
such a note in good faith and without notice that it may be subject to
the defense of usury. 135 Thus, the note could become usurious in the
hands of a nonexempt transferee. This argument is based on the prem-
ise that the exemptions create a special privilege in that only an exempt
lender is entitled to "receive" interest in excess of the maximum rate;
however, this argument was rejected by the court in Strike.'36
These principles must now be examined in light of the language of
Proposition 2 which exempts from the interest rate restrictions "any
successor in interest to any loan or forbearance exempted under this
article." The purpose of this provision, as stated in the legislative anal-
ysis, was to establish that a loan, which was exempt when made, would
continue to be exempt after sale or transfer to a nonexempt third
party. 37 Is the concept of a "successor in interest" identical to or dif-
ferent from the concepts upheld in Strike and Boerner? Must a trans-
feree act in good faith to be a "successor"? Although it could be argued
that the blanket exemption of all "successor[s] in interest" relaxes the
"good faith" test articulated in Boerner, it is unlikely that a court will
deem itself precluded from inquiring into whether there was a bona
133. "(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (a) For value; and
(b) In good faith; and (c) Without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person .... " CAL. COM. CODE § 3302
(West 1964). See also id § 3305, comment 1.
134. See generally Abbot v. Stevens, 133 Cal. App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955); Knoll v.
Scheussner, 112 Cal. App. 876, 247 P.2d 370 (1952); Goldenzwig v. Shaddock, 31 Cal. App.
2d 719, 88 P.2d 933 (1939); O.A. Graybeal Co. v. Cook, 111 Cal. App. 518, 295 P. 1088
(1931).
135. If this rule were followed, it could create confusion with respect to how the maxi-
mum rate under Proposition 2 should be determined. Would the relevant rate-setting date
be the date of the original contract or the date of the assignment to the nonexempt trans-
feree?
136. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 745, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
137. "Under the measure, a loan which is exempt from the provision of the usury law at
the time it is made would continue to be exempt from these provisions even if it is sold or
transferred to another party." California Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 6, 1979), at 10.
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fide transaction in the first instance or whether, viewing the transaction
as a whole, the exempt lender was merely a "conduit," and the transac-
tion was actually a loan made by the nonexempt transferee at an inter-
est rate in excess of the maximum permissible rate.'38 The obvious risk
associated with "conduit" financing, however, does not necessarily
mean that all prearranged or concurrent transactions may be invalid.
Boerner expressly upheld prearranged, concurrent transactions. What
Boerner does suggest is that such transactions must be consummated in
good faith and that such good faith is likely to be measured by the
relationship between the exempt lender and the borrower.
How is such "good faith" to be determined in the context of a loan
by an exempt lender and a sale of that loan to a nonexempt lender?
Relevant questions might be: Whose customer is the borrower? Who
made the credit decision? Were proper disclosures made to the bor-
rower?'39 Whose funds were advanced? Is the loan of a type that the
exempt lender regularly makes in the ordinary course of business for its
own account? Is the sale of the loan an isolated transaction or part of a
"package" purchase of a portion of the exempt lender's portfolio? If
the loan is originated by the exempt lender, funded by the exempt
lender and sold to an investor in a bona fide, separate transaction, it is
likely to be upheld even though the sale may have been prearranged.
These concepts are supported by provisions of the California Corpora-
tions Code 40 which specifically exempt certain activities of foreign
lending institutions from many California regulations, including quali-
fication, licensing, and taxation, if such activities are carried on outside
California. Included in the permitted activities are "the acquisition by
purchase, by contract to purchase, by making advance commitments to
purchase or by assignment of loans, secured or unsecured, or any inter-
est therein."'' Therefore, except for sham transactions, exempt lend-
ers should be able to sell loans to nonexempt lenders and, under proper
circumstances, to enter into advance commitments to sell such loans,
138. See, e.g., Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21 Cal. 3d 37, 577 P.2d 200, 145 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945); Sondeno v.
Union Commerce Bank, 71 Cal. App. 3d 391, 139 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1977); O.A. Graybeal v.
Cook, 111 Cal. App. 518, 295 P. 1088 (1931); Smith v. Cavaglieri Mortgage Co., 111 Cal.
App. 136, 295 P. 366 (1931); 50 Ops. CAL. ATrey GEN. 110 (1967). See also Coral Gables
First Nat'l Bank v. Constructors of Fla., Inc., 119 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). But
cf. California Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 6, 1979), at 10 (Proposition 2 may restrict the court
from inquiring into the circumstances surrounding a sale or transfer).
139. This fact assisted the Boerner court in distinguishing Glaire. See note 126 supra.
140. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 191, 2104 (West 1977).
141. Id § 191(d)(1).
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provided such commitments are entered into in good faith in the ordi-
nary course of business.
The language of Proposition 2 does not resolve an open question
under current law as to whether a transferee is protected only with re-
spect to the initial loan or forbearance or whether any subsequent ad-
vances or forbearances should be considered to be new loans or
forbearances and, as such, subject to the interest rate restrictions of
Proposition 2 if made by a nonexempt lender. It seems likely that a
transferee would not be a "successor" with respect to subsequent ad-
vances or forbearances and in view of the lack of any explicit authority
indicating that the exemption was intended to encompass such matters,
a nonexempt transferee should not make subsequent advances or for-
bearances at a rate not otherwise permissible under Proposition 2. As a
practical matter, this may mean that some subsequent advances and
forbearances may have to bear an interest rate lower than the rate on
the original loan.'42
2. Loan Participations Between Exempt and Nonexempt Lenders
A related problem is whether the "successors in interest" language
of Proposition 2 will be effective to shelter participations by nonexempt
lenders with loans made by exempt lenders. In a typical transaction,
the loan is originated by an exempt lender who is named as payee in
the promissory note executed by the borrower and who is named as the
secured party in the relevant collateral documents. The exempt lender
then "sells" a participation, ie., a percentage of the principal amount
of the loan, to an investor for an equivalent cash price. 43 The transac-
142. Two recent cases, McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 21 Cal.
3d 365, 578 P.2d 1375, 146 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1978), and Arneill Ranch v. Petit, 64 Cal. App. 3d
277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1976), have raised, at least in theory, an additional area of concern
for the nonexempt lender who is a transferee of a variable rate loan. The cases suggest that
each change in the interest rate may constitute a separate term of forbearance. This premise
could lead to the conclusion that adjustments to the interest rate after assignment to the
transferee might produce a subsequent "forbearance" within the meaning of Proposition 2.
Nevertheless, the general rule that usury is determined at the time the loan is made and the
"earlier of' language in Proposition 2 should resolve such concerns and permit the trans-
feree to receive interest in accordance with the terms of the note without being subject to the
Usury Law.
143. If the participation is sold "with recourse" against the exempt lender or if the exempt
lender guarantees payment or agrees to repurchase the participation upon default, the trans-
action may be viewed as a loan from the participant to the exempt lender. See, e.g., West
Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Fin. Loans, 2 Cal. 3d 594, 469 P.2d 665, 86 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1970). However, even if such transactions are deemed to be loans to the exempt lenders, the
language in Proposition 2 relating to the "obligations" of exempt lenders should resolve the
usury issue. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
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tion entitles the investor to a pro rata portion of the interest paid on the
loan and, of course, to the repayment of his portion of the principal at
maturity. The exempt lender usually retains the servicing 1"w of the loan
and the borrower often may not know that a participant is involved.
Thus, in form, the loan has been made by and continues to be held by
an exempt lender. The sale of a participation, however, is often prear-
ranged and occurs concurrently with the original funding. Thus, in
fact, a portion of the loan proceeds may come directly from the nonex-
empt participant and the exempt lender may never bear the entire
credit risk. Under such circumstances, the nonexempt participant
could be held to be a "lender" for purposes of the Usury Law.
In the case of Sondeno v. Union Commerce Bank,'45 the defendant
bank, Union, was an Ohio state-chartered bank and thus apparently
was not entitled to one of the exemptions enumerated in the California
Constitution. Union extended a commitment to a California borrower
for a $1,912,000 construction loan on condition that the borrower find a
California bank to participate in the loan. Barclays, a California state-
chartered bank, agreed to participate and, in accordance with the com-
mitment, the loan was closed by Barclays, the note and deed of trust
were executed in favor of Barclays, and Union obtained a 75% partici-
pation in the loan. The borrower experienced difficulty in obtaining its
permanent financing and requested a six-month extension. Union in-
formed Barclays that it would approve the extension conditioned, inter
alia, upon payment of interest at 11.5% plus an additional fee of
$9,562.50.146 After the loan was repaid, the borrower alleged that the
extension was usurious and sought treble damages for the interest paid
during the extension term, together with punitive damages of $750,000.
The trial court sustained Union's demurrer and dismissed the com-
plaint.
On appeal, Union urged that the loan documents established that
the loan was made solely by Barclays because Barclays was the sole
payee of the note and the sole beneficiary under the deed of trust. The
court of appeal rejected this argument because the complaint alleged
that the form of the transaction was a device to avoid the Usury Law
and held that the dispositive issue was whether Union was an exempt
lender for purposes of the Usury Law. After examining relevant sec-
144. "Servicing" a loan normally includes receiving payments, keeping certain books and
records, monitoring and inspecting collateral, and assisting in enforcement and collection
matters. Typically, the exempt lender receives a servicing fee which is based on the out-
standing principal balance of the loan and which is usually deducted from the interest paid
by the borrower.
145. 71 Cal. App. 3d 391, 139 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1977).
146. Id at 393, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
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tions of the California Financial Code, the court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court, concluding that, with respect to the loans at issue,
Union was a "bank as defined in and operating under.. . [the] Bank
Act" and was thus entitled to the usury exemption.'47
It is important to observe, however, that the Sondeno court consid-
ered the exemption provisions of the California Constitution only be-
cause the court refused to rule that Union had not made a loan to the
California borrower. Without much discussion, the court concluded
that Union was a direct lender (rather than an assignee) for purposes of
the Usury Law. This result seems justified, since Union made the ini-
tial credit decision, issued a loan commitment directly to the borrower,
funded 75% of the loan, and participated in the decision to raise the
interest rate for the extension term. Sondeno was decided before
Boerner and the court in Sondeno did not discuss the possible applica-
tion of any "good faith" test. Nevertheless, it is likely that the transac-
tion in Sondeno would not pass the "good faith" test in Boerner
because the borrower was Union's customer, Union issued the original
commitment and made the credit decisions, and Barclays was appar-
ently involved merely to facilitate the consummation of the transaction
and had no significant independent role. These facts perhaps dis-
tinguish Sondeno from Boerner and suggest that participations which
meet the test in Boerner may be valid and that such participants may be
held to be "successor[s] in interest" within the meaning of Proposition
2. If the exempt lender retains the servicing, as is customary, both the
loan and the exempt lender remain subject to regulation and it is diffi-
cult to see why the borrower should object since he will not be paying
more than he contracted to pay. Nevertheless, the law appears to be
unsettled, at least with respect to investors other than non-California
state-chartered banks, and concurrent participations should, therefore,
be viewed with considerable caution even though such transactions
might otherwise be negotiated and consummated in good faith.
147. Id at 396, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33. The court based its conclusion on three princi-
ples: first, the reference to the "Bank Act" in the constitution was construed to be a refer-
ence to the California Financial Code; second, the definition of "bank" in § 102 of the
Financial Code was broad enough to include a non-California state-chartered bank; and
third, § 1757 of the Financial Code permitted the activities undertaken by Union without
subjecting it to licensing requirements, thus Union was "operating under" the provision of
the Financial Code. .d at 394-96, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32. Although the first two princi-
ples seem defensible, the conclusion that Union was "operating under" the provision of the




III. EFFECT OF PROPOSITION 2 ON EXISTING TRANSACTIONS
Although the effective date of Proposition 2 is November 7,
1979,148 the effect that Proposition 2 will have on loans made or con-
tracts to make loans executed prior to that date is uncertain under pres-
ent California law. On the one hand, there is no indication that the
legislature intended Proposition 2 to have a retroactive effect and the
general rule is that in the absence of an express intention to the con-
trary, constitutional or other statutory provisions operate only prospec-
tively.149 This conclusion is supported by the general proposition that
the validity of a contract is determined by the law in existence at the
time the contract is made and that subsequent changes in the law do
not affect its validity or become a part of the contract unless the parties
clearly intended otherwise.150 Therefore, if this reasoning is followed,
existing usurious loans should continue to be so after the effective date
of Proposition 2.151
There is some California authority, however, which suggests that
contracts that would have been usurious under a prior law, but which
would not be usurious if made after the enactment of a change in the
law, become valid and enforceable. 52 In Wolfv. Pacfic Southwest Dis-
148. See note 8 supra.
149. Hopkins v. Anderson, 218 Cal. 62, 21 P.2d 560 (1933); Vallejo Ferry Co. v. Lang &
McPherson, 161 Cal. 672, 120 P. 421 (1911); Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 (1881).
Prior statutory or constitutional enactments in California relating to usury have been held to
operate only prospectively after being amended to operate more restrictively. See In re
Zemansky, 39 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (1934 constitutional amendments); Wilbur v.
Griffins, 56 Cal. App. 668, 206 P. 112 (1922) (1918 usury initiative). Because the new enact-
ments addressed in both of these cases were more restrictive than prior law, to construe such
enactments as operating retroactively, therefore, may have raised constitutional questions as
to the impairment of the obligations of existing contracts. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.l; CAL.
CONsT. art. 1, § 16. Proposition 2, however, does not operate more restrictively than prior
law and therefore would not raise these problems.
150. See, e.g., Swenson v. File, 3 Cal. 3d 389, 475 P.2d 852, 90 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1970);
Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 373 P.2d 640, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1962); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Wolfangle, 111 Cal. App. 119, 295 P. 388 (1931).
To the same effect are decisions specifically holding that the validity of the interest payable
on a loan or forbearance is determined at the time of the execution of the contract. See, e.g.,
Islais Co. v. Matheson, 3 Cal. 2d 657, 45 P.2d 326 (1935); Kraemer v. Coward, 2 Cal. App.
2d 506, 38 P.2d 458 (1934).
151. See, e.g., Westman v. Dye, 214 Cal. 28, 4 P.2d 134 (1931); Abbot v. Stevens, 133 Cal.
App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955); Grail v. San Diego Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 127 Cal. App.
250, 15 P.2d 797 (1932); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-2 (West 1970). The penalty provisions
contained in §§ 1916-2 and 1916-3 of the California Civil Code do not appear to be inconsis-
tent with the provisions of Proposition 2 and, therefore, would not be affected by Proposition
2. See Nuckolls v. Bank of Cal., 10 Cal. 2d 266, 74 P.2d 264 (1937); Penziner v. West Am.
Fin. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 74 P.2d 252 (1937).
152. Wolf v. Pacific Sw. Discount Corp., 10 Cal. 2d 183, 74 P.2d 263 (1937). There is
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count Corp.,53 the California Supreme Court held that an action to
recover treble the amount of usurious interest paid to a licensed per-
sonal property broker could not be maintained after the adoption of the
1934 constitutional amendment, which exempted personal property
brokers even though the loan had been made and the interest paid
prior to the effective date of the constitutional amendment. The court
found that
[t]he constitutional amendment repealing provisions of the
usury law as to those exempted classes contains no saving
clause as to causes of action accruing prior to the adoption of
said amendment. A repeal of the statute, or an amendment
thereof, resulting in a repeal of the statutory provision under
which the cause of action arose, wipes out the cause of action
unless the same has been merged into a final judgment.
54
Construed narrowly, Wolf only furnishes a precedent that may
validate prior usurious loans made by newly exempted lenders, such as
licensed real estate brokers. Proposition 2 does not contain any savings
clause preserving prior claims or causes of action arising out of prior
usurious loans and, therefore, if Wof is followed, such loans should
now be valid and enforceable. The rationale in the Wof case, how-
ever, is based on the much broader principle that a statutory right, as
opposed to a common law right, is destroyed by the repeal of the stat-
ute under which it arose unless such right was reduced to a final judg-
ment prior to such repeal or unless the repealing statute contains a
savings clause.' 55 Wolf, therefore, supports the premise that Proposi-
tion 2, by repealing the 10% limitation on interest rates for nonexempt
lenders, effectively validates any existing loans or contracts to make
loans at rates in excess of 10% but less than the rates permitted by Prop-
substantial authority in other jurisdictions holding that usury law amendments may operate
retroactively so as to validate contracts that were usurious when made. The rationale of the
courts is generally similar to that of Wolf, or it is based on the premise that usury laws are in
the nature of penal statutes so that repeal of such statutes without a savings clause destroys
any rights of action or defenses that may have arisen thereunder. See, e.g., United Realty
Trust v. Property Dev. & Research Co., 269 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1978); American Say. Life
Ins. Co. v. Financial Affairs Mgmt. Co., 20 Ariz. App. 479, 513 P.2d 1362 (1973). There is
dictum to the effect of the latter rationale in Willcox v. Edwards, 162 Cal. 455, 123 P. 276
(1912), and Fenton v. Markwell & Co., 11 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 755, 52 P.2d 297 (1935).
There is, however, scant authority which has not given retroactive effect to amendments to
usury laws in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Tremper v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
11 Wash. 2d 461, 119 P.2d 707 (1941).
153. 10 Cal. 2d 183, 74 P.2d 263 (1937).
154. Id at 185, 74 P.2d at 264.
155. See, ag., Southern Serv. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 2d 1, 97 P.2d 963
(1940); Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 P. 62 (1930).
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osition 2.156 It should be noted, however, that section 1916-2 of the
California Civil Code does not provide merely that usury is a defense
to the payment of interest; rather, it provides that the obligation to pay
interest on a usurious loan is "null and void."' 5 7 If "void" means
"void" rather than "voidable," an existing usurious loan may continue
to be usurious, notwithstanding the enactment of Proposition 2.158
Although the rationale of Wofseems persuasive, lenders and bor-
rowers may wish to consider how their existing transactions can be
brought within the coverage of Proposition 2. In this respect, a distinc-
tion may be made between funded and unfunded loans. With respect
to funded loans, it is clear that although the protection of the Usury
Law may not be waived by the borrower at the inception of the
loan,'59 a potential usury claim may be settled like any other claim.' 60
If a lender wishes to validate a transaction that arguably would have
been usurious under prior law, the lender should obtain a release of the
usury claim for a valid consideration (such as the advancement of addi-
tional funds, the extension of the term of the loan, the waiver of a de-
fault, etc.), or purge the transaction of usury for the period prior to the
effective date of Proposition 2 and apply the higher rate only for subse-
quent periods. If commitment letters are issued, or contracts are exe-
cuted prior to the effective date of Proposition 2 but the loan has not
yet been funded, the parties should be able to obtain the benefits of
Proposition 2 by executing a new contract or commitment at a date
subsequent to the effective date of Proposition 2. Such new contract or
commitment should include an acknowledgment that its purpose is to
rescind the previous agreement and to substitute a new, valid agree-
ment that complies with the provisions of Proposition 2.161
A related question is the effect of provisions in existing loans that
156. See, e.g., Swenson v. File, 3 Cal. 3d 389, 475 P.2d 852, 90 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1970). Of
course in cases in which the parties wish to amend their contract or commitment in some
substantive respect, or to rescind their obligations thereunder, such amendments will require
mutual consideration to be binding. See, e.g., Fairlane Estates, Inc. v. Carrico Constr. Co.,
228 Cal. App. 2d 65, 39 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1964); Selby v. Battley, 149 Cal. App. 2d 659, 309 P.2d
120 (1957).
157. See note 23 supra.
158. If this argument was made in Wof, it was not reflected in the court's opinion. How-
ever, a void contract cannot generally be revived by a subsequent change in law, although
usury may be an exception to such a rule. See general, Willcox v. Edwards, 162 Cal. 455,
123 P. 276 (1912).
159. In re Vehm Eng'r Corp., 521 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1975); Stock v. Meek, 35 Cal. 2d 809,
221 P.2d 15 (1950).
160. Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 18 P.2d 333 (1933); Westman v. Dye, 214 Cal. 28, 4
P.2d 134 (1931); Kogan v. Bergman, 244 Cal. App. 2d 613, 53 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1966).
161. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
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limit the interest charged thereunder to the "maximum rate permitted
by law." Even if Proposition 2 is not applied retroactively, there re-
mains the question whether such provisions permit the lender to adjust
the interest charged for the balance of the term of the loan, commenc-
ing upon the effective date of Proposition 2.162 The answer turns on
whether the parties properly expressed their intent to incorporate a
change in the law if such an event should occiir and whether the enact-
ment of Proposition 2 is such a change in the law that permits the par-
ties to accomplish their expressed intent. Although each transaction
must necessarily be examined separately to determine the intent of the
parties and the particular language used, the enactment of Proposition
2 should permit lenders to adjust the interest rate in accordance with
the provisions of the note for the balance of the term of the loan so long
as the adjusted rate does not exceed the maximum rate now permitted
under Proposition 2. Such a result should not be construed as applying
Proposition 2 "retroactively" but merely as giving full effect to the ex-
isting agreement of the parties. The enactment of Proposition 2 is,
therefore, analogous to the occurrence of any other future condition or
event that the parties may contemplate and provide for in their agree-
ments so long as the provision is lawful at the time performance is re-
quired.
163
Assuming that existing loan contracts are entitled to the benefits of
Proposition 2, because Proposition 2 operates retroactively to eliminate
a borrower's usury claim, or because the parties contracted for a varia-
ble rate not to exceed the "maximum permitted by law," or because the
parties expressly bring their agreements within the coverage of Proposi-
tion 2, it is unclear how the maximum interest rate should be deter-
mined. Is the relevant rate-setting date the date of execution of the
original contract to make the loan, the effective date of Proposition 2,
or some other date? As indicated above, the language of Proposition 2
seems to require that the appropriate rate be determined by reference
to the "earlier of' the date of the original funding or the date of execu-
tion of the original loan contract. This could mean a rate-setting date
determined months or years prior to the enactment of Proposition 2
when the parties could not have contemplated its adoption or antici-
pated its provisions. Although this result seems unnecessary and could
create confusion, it is probably the conclusion most consistent with the
162. A similar question arises under the Depository Institutions Act. See notes 299-303
infra and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., United Bank & Trust Co. v. Brown, 203 Cal. 359, 264 P. 482 (1928); CAL.
CIv. CODE §§ 1451, 1599, 1641, 1643 (West 1954).
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express language of Proposition 2. 1 An argument may be made, how-
ever, that the effective date of Proposition 2, November 7, 1979, is a
more appropriate date because it provides a common reference point
for all existing loans affected by Proposition 2 and appears to be more
consistent with the general rule that changes in the law are incorpo-
rated into existing contracts upon the effective date of such changes,
assuming the parties intended subsequent changes in the law to become
a part of their contract.' 65 Ordinarily, such changes are incorporated at
the time the new law takes effect and do not operate retroactively or
readjust prior rights between the parties, unless the parties clearly in-
tended such a result. 1
66
In conclusion, although there seem to be persuasive arguments
and respectable authority for the retroactive application of Proposition
2, if the parties desire to confirm the validity of their agreements and to
receive the benefits of Proposition 2, the parties should consider execut-
ing an amendment or modification to their loan agreements, expressly
acknowledging the enactment of Proposition 2 and confirming their
mutual intent with respect to the determination of the maximum inter-
est rate. As indicated above, 167 such amendments should constitute
subsequent "contracts" for a "forbearance" within the meaning of
Proposition 2, thus enabling the parties to utilize the date of execution
of such amendments as the relevant rate-setting date.
IV. CHOICE-OF-LAW POLICIES AND USURY IN CALIFORNIA
Prior to the enactment of Proposition 2, when market rates ex-
ceeded 10% per annum, California borrowers and non-California lend-
ers often attempted to shelter their transactions from a claim of usury
by choosing the law of another state (usually the lender's state) with a
more favorable usury law. Since many institutional lenders have op-
portunities to invest money in other states without usury risks, the mo-
tivation for such transactions often originated with the borrower, not
the lender. Although this approach may be less necessary in light of
the enactment of Proposition 2 and the Depository Institutions Act, it
still is likely to remain a viable alternative for many loans, especially
until some of the uncertainties created by Proposition 2 are resolved.
In addition, the enactment of Proposition 2 may be viewed as facilitat-
164. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Swenson v. File, 3 Cal. 3d 389, 475 P.2d 852, 90 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1970);
Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Wolfangle, 111 Cal. App. 119, 295 P. 388 (1931).
167. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
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ing such non-California transactions because it further demonstrates
that California does not have a strong public policy against rates that
exceed 10% per annum and that commercial loans and real estate loans
may be treated in a more favorable, flexible manner than was the case
prior to the enactment of Proposition 2. With these factors in mind,
this article examines the impact of Proposition 2 on usury and choice-
of-law policies in California.
A1. Introduction
"Conflict of laws is one of the most hazardous of subjects, and it is
with hesitation that I approach it."' 68 In the twenty years since Chief
Justice Traynor made the above comment, the law governing choice-
of-law questions has continued to receive a great deal of attention. The
traditional view relies on fixed rules of conflict of laws, such as those set
forth in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.' 69 For example, the Re-
statement provides that the law of the place of contracting controls the
validity of the contract, 70 but that if the place of performance is else-
where, the law of the latter jurisdiction controls with respect to ques-
tions relating to the performance of the contract.' 7' With respect to
debt obligations, the place of payment is normally considered to be the
place of performance for purposes of determining the applicable law.1
72
These rules were used in order to obtain certainty of application and
often worked to the exclusion of state interests.
A second theory, manifest in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws 1 3 prefers, in the absence of a stipulation by the parties, the law
of the jurisdiction that has the "most significant relationship" to the
transaction.' 74 When the parties expressly choose a governing law,
however, a more liberal rule is applied. Section 203 of the Restatement
(Second) provides that the validity of a contract will be sustained
against a charge of usury if it provides for a rate of interest that is
permissible in a state to which the contract has a "substantial relation-
ship" provided the rate of interest is not greatly in excess of the rate
permitted by the usury law otherwise applicable under the rule set forth
168. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Traynor].
169. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
170. Id. § 311.
171. Id § 358.
172. Id § 365.
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)].
174. Id § 188.
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in section 188. Under this rule, it may be possible for a transaction to
have a "substantial relationship" with more than one state, thereby per-
mitting the parties to choose the governing law from several such states
for their transactions. 75 On the other hand, in the absence of such a
choice, section 188 appears to provide that there is only one state with
the "most significant relationship." '176
A third approach, suggested by a number of writers in the field of
usury, is the "rule of validation." This well established rule, which
"enjoys an undisputed existence," '177 provides that a contract for the
payment of interest will be validated, whenever possible, by applying
the more lenient usury statute of any state sufficiently connected with
the contract. Section 203 of the Restatement (Second) appears to adopt
a similar rule.1
78
Another theory, considered by many to be the trend in California,
is the governmental interest approach, which is based on the determi-
nation of whether the forum state has a legitimate interest in the appli-
cation of its own law. 179 Using this approach, the forum state considers
all of the foreign and domestic contacts with a transaction and deter-
mines the interests of each state in the application of its law to the
transaction. If the forum state has substantial contacts with the trans-
action and a legitimate interest in applying its law, then the forum state
will apply its law to the transaction, even though other states have con-
tacts with the transaction and a legitimate interest in the application of
their law. 8 ' Recent decisions suggest that California courts have
adopted the governmental interest approach, perhaps with modifica-
tions, in noncommercial transactions.' Although the language in
such opinions is quite broad, it is not yet certain whether the govern-
175. See, e.g., Garner v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr.
230 (1976). See notes 184-191 infra and accompanying text.
176. See note 200 infra.
177. Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55
CALIF. L. REv. 123, 125 (1967) (quoting Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts, 51 YALE
L.J. 893, 912 (1942)).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 203, supra note 173, provides as follows:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a sub-
stantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general
usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188.
Comment b states: "Usury is a field where this policy of validation is particularly apparent."
Id comment b. See also id comment b, Illustrations 1 & 2.
179. See generaly Traynor, supra note 168.
180. See B. CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 188-89 (1963).
181. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215 (1976).
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mental interest approach would be applied to disputes concerning com-
mercial transactions.
B. The California Cases
Although there are numerous California cases involving conflicts
of laws in other fact situations, California courts have not often consid-
ered these problems with respect to potentially usurious interstate or
international commercial transactions. Early California cases involv-
ing choice-of-law questions, decided at a time when the Restatement
approach predominated, upheld the commercial transactions involved
therein on the basis of, inter alia, the rule of validation. 182 Three recent
California appellate decisions and one Ninth Circuit decision, how-
ever, have considered choice-of-law issues in cases dealing with poten-
tially usurious commercial transactions.'83 In three of these cases, the
contract had a choice-of-law provision and the courts relied primarily
on the special usury rules of section 203 of the Restatement (Second) in
determining whether the chosen state had a substantial relationship
with the transaction and whether there was a violation of a fundamen-
tal forum policy. In the fourth case, there apparently was no choice-of-
law provision in the contract and the court seems to have relied on
concepts similar to the general contract rules of section 188 of the Re-
statement (Second) in determining which state had the "most signifi-
cant relationship" to the transaction.
1. The Gamer Case
The most recent California appellate decision involving choice-of-
law and usury is Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc. 84 In that case,
the court upheld a contract against a charge of usury by applying New
York law. The dispute arose under a contract for a securities margin
account on which, for the periods in dispute, the effective rate of inter-
est charged the plaintiff ranged between 9.5% per annum and 12.25%
per annum. The plaintiff sought to recover the allegedly usurious inter-
est on behalf of himself and a class of other parties to such agreements.
The contract contained a provision which stated that the laws of the
State of New York were to govern the rights of the parties. The trial
182. See, e.g., Robbins v. Pacific E. Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 241, 272-74, 65 P.2d 42, 58-59 (1937);
Kraemer v. Coward, 2 Cal. App. 2d 506, 38 P.2d 458 (1934).
183. Garner v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976);
Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. K & L Litho Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 697, 91 Cal. Rptr.
827 (1970); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964);
Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Pa. Mortgage Trust, 599 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1979).
184. 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976).
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court, relying on this provision and on the validity of the interest
charged under New York law, granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant and the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the court considered three grounds for rejecting the
choice-of-law provision in the contract. First, plaintiff argued that be-
cause the contract was a printed form prepared by the defendant, it was
a contract of adhesion that violated California's public policy. Second,
plaintiff argued that the contract's choice of New York law had no
substantial relationship to the transaction because the agreement was
signed, all buy and sell orders were placed, many orders were executed,
and all payments were made in California. Third, plaintiff argued that
the choice of New York law, if upheld, would result in a violation of
California's fundamental public policy against usury. The court re-
jected all three arguments.
First, the court noted that contracts of adhesion are frequently en-
forced, and that the plaintiff had read and understood the provisions of
the contract. It cited Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp.185
to the effect that even choice-of-law provisions in contracts of adhesion
are usually respected unless they violate a fundamental forum policy.
Second, the Gamer court concluded that the transaction had a sub-
stantial relationship with the chosen state, New York, citing the Re-
statement (Second) section 187.186 Even though the court accepted
plaintiff's contentions that the transaction had a substantial relation-
ship with the forum state, California, because the agreement was signed
in California, all payments were made in California, all orders were
placed in California, and most orders were executed on the Pacific
Stock Exchange in California, the court ruled that the transaction also
185. 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1972).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187, supra note 173, provides as follows:
(I) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that
issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fun-
damental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the
local law of the state of the chosen law.
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bore a substantial relationship to the State of New York because the
defendant's principal place of business was in New York and the de-
fendant's making of a settlement for shares purchased for the plaintiffs
margin account was accomplished in New York. In the court's view,
this settlement, not the accepting of an order to buy securities for plain-
tiff, was the extension of credit, and thus the loan was made in New
York.187 The important aspect of Gamer is that it recognizes that a
transaction may have a "substantial relationship" with more than one
state. So long as it has a substantial relationship with the chosen state,
the transaction is likely to be upheld.' This test is different from the
test set forth in section 188 of the Restatement (Second) in which, in the
absence of a choice by the parties, the court is required to apply the law
of the state with the "most significant relationship" to the transaction.
With respect to the third argument, the court held that the choice
of New York law would not violate a fundamental California policy
against usury. The court distinguished between a policy against usury
(the charging of excessive interest) and a policy against interest that
exceeded a particular rate.8 9 After noting that any enforcement of a
choice-of-law provision assumes some difference in policy, the court
considered various factors, including the regulation of securities mar-
kets by the federal government and the legitimate connections of the
transaction with New York. The court also took judicial notice that the
"prime rate" had been as high as 9% per annum in the period at issue
and referred to the exemptions granted certain lenders from the Cali-
fornia usury laws. In addition, the court cited section 1105 of the Cali-
fornia Commerical Code, 90 which permits choice-of-law provisions, as
supporting "by analogy" the validity of the choice-of-law made in the
contract at issue. Summing all the factors it had discussed, the court
held that the contract at issue in Gamer "did not offend against a policy
of California law," although the precise reasoning by which it reached
this conclusion was not disclosed.'
187. The Washington Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in a case involving
similar facts. O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 586 P.2d 830
(1978).
188. The court in Gamer held that "substantial relationship" and "reasonable relation-
ship" are equivalent to each other. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 290, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
189. Id. at 287, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
190. CAL. COM. CODE § 1105 (West Supp. 1979) provides that "[w]hen a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may
agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights
and duties."
191. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 290, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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2. The Ury Case
An earlier appellate decision involving choice of law and usury is
Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp. 192 The lender in that case, a New
York corporation, had only six or seven clients located in California.
The plaintiff-borrower was first contacted by a representative of the
lender in California, but his initial application for credit was rejected.
The borrower made persistent efforts to obtain a loan, including a trip
to New York, and the application was eventually approved. At the
insistence of the lender, the borrower incorporated, thereby losing the
protection of the New York usury law,193 and the financing was con-
summated. The lender prepared a financing contract in the form of a
proposal by the borrower that was accepted by the lender in New York
and that expressly stipulated that the contract was to be construed ac-
cording to New York law. The loan provided for interest payments at
a rate slightly more than 20% per annum and was secured by the bor-
rower's accounts receivable which presumably had a situs in Califor-
nia. The borrower subsequently sued for declaratory relief, rescission
or reformation of the contract and penalties, all on the basis that the
contract was usurious. The trial court upheld the contract on the
ground that New York and not California usury law controlled and the
plaintiff appealed.
The judgment was affirmed by the court of appeal, which empha-
sized four elements in the case. First, there was evidence that the con-
tract was made in New York because the last act necessary to the
creation of the contract, the acceptance, was performed in that state. 1
94
Second, New York was the place of principal performance of the con-
tract; the money was made available to the borrower there by deposit to
its bank account and was partially repaid. 9 5 Third, the parties had
stipulated that the contract was to be "construed" according to the laws
of New York. 196 Although the stipulation was not as broad as those in
which the parties stipulated that the law of a certain state should pre-
vail in all matters concerning the contract, the court concluded that the
stipulation did effectively contradict any idea that the parties intended
California usury law to apply. Fourth, the agreement was not a "con-
192. 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
193. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(1) (McKinney 1978) provides: "No corporation
shall hereafter interpose the defense of usury in any action." A corporation may, however,
impose a defense based on criminal usury, ie., interest in excess of 25% per annum. Id.
§ 5-521(3).
194. 227 Cal. App. 2d at 16, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
195. Id at 16-17, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
196. Id. at 17, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
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tract of adhesion" because the borrower engaged in extensive negotia-
tion and was acting with the advice of counsel available. More
importantly, the court appeared to single out commercial loan transac-
tions for special treatment:
In general, the courts have treated commercial loan
transactions in a special manner and have enforced contracts
which are valid in the state of making and performance al-
though they are usurious in the state of the forum, where all
or even some of the factors given above are present.'
97
The Ury court rejected the borrower's contention that California
has a strong public policy against usury, at least in a choice-of-law con-
text, stating that such a policy would be incompatible with the exemp-
tions from the Usury Law contained in the California Constitution:
A strong public policy, based on a settled concept of justice or
morality would not be meshed with such alterable rates as the
Legislature might choose to impose. In fact, the Legislature
has imposed no maximum rate for banks. The loan in this
case, if it had been made by a bank in California and was
payable here, could be enforced.' 98
3. The Rochester Case
Another appellate decision suggests, however, that the California
courts will not invariably validate otherwise usurious transactions by
applying choice-of-law doctrines. In Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v.
K & L Litho Corp., 199 the court held a personal property sale-leaseback
transaction to be a disguised loan with an imputed interest rate of
11.5% per annum. Rochester argued on appeal that since the docu-
ments required all payments to be made at its New York office, New
York was the place of performance of the contract and its law should
govern,2 °° citing Ury. The court rejected that argument, reciting the
substantial contacts of the transaction with California.
197. Id at 19, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
198. Id at 20, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
199. 13 Cal. App. 3d 697, 91 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1970).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 188, supra note 173, provides as follows:
The Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the
law applicable to an issue include:
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The Rochester transaction was apparently negotiated and carried
out, to a substantial extent, in California. Moreover, it does not appear
that the documents contained a New York choice-of-law provision, and
the court's decision appears to be based on a conclusion that California
had the "most significant relationship" to the transaction, although the
court did not cite section 188 of the Restatement (Second) or discuss
choice-of-law theories in any detail. The Rochester decision is troub-
ling to the extent that it lacks any discussion of "policy" issues and is
based in part on post-closing contacts in California created by Roches-
ter's efforts to enforce its rights under the agreement. Nevertheless, in
light of Gamer and recent California cases adopting the governmental
interest approach, the Rochester opinion is not likely to be influential in
resolving future choice-of-law problems.
4. The Sarlot-Kantarjian Case
In the recent Ninth Circuit case of Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Penn-
sylvania Mortgage Trust,20 the court upheld a choice-of-law provision
selecting Massachusetts law. Sarlot-Kantarjian (S-K) was a California
general partnership formed to develop a sixty-six unit condominium
project in Los Angeles. Sarlot, a contractor, and Kantarjian, a lawyer,
were both knowledgeable and experienced in construction and real es-
tate ventures.20 2 S-K sought -construction financing from First Penn-
sylvania Mortgage Trust (the Trust), a Massachusetts business trust
with its principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. The
Trust issued a commitment to provide a two-year $3.2 million loan at a
rate of 5% over the prime rate. After the commitment letter was exe-
cuted by S-K and received by the Trust, the Trust engaged California
legal counsel to prepare the loan documents. The documents specified
that the documents should be construed in accordance with Massachu-
setts law. Sarlot and Kantarjian travelled to Boston to close the loan
and obtain the initial disbursement of funds. The loan documents were
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203..
201. 599 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1979).
202. Id at 916.
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executed in Boston, the closing occurred in Boston, and all loan pro-
ceeds were paid into S-K's transfer account in Boston. All repayments
of the loan were made to the Trust's account in Boston. When the loan
was fully repaid, S-K initiated an action against the Trust for usury.
The Trust acknowledged that the interest paid was in excess of 10% and
thus would be usurious under California law, but contended that Mas-
sachusetts law should govern in accordance with the agreement of the
parties.
The court agreed, citing section 187 of the Restatement (Second),
which states that the law of the chosen state will be applied unless the
chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or transaction
or if the application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to
a fundamental policy of the forum state.2"3 The court rejected S-K's
contention that the chosen state must have the most substantial rela-
tionship and found that "Massachusetts had very significant contacts
with the transaction" 2" even though the borrower was a California
general partnership and the loan was secured by real estate in Califor-
nia. The court then cited Ur to support its finding that "California's
public policy against usury is not offended by the adoption of Massa-
chusetts law in this case."2 °5
Sarlot-Kantarian is thus consistent with Ury and Gamer in its
conclusion that the location of the lender and the situs of certain other
elements, such as closing, funding, and repayment, are sufficient to cre-
ate a "substantial relationship with the chosen state." These cases also
conclude that California does not have a strong policy against usury, at
least with respect to commercial loan transactions when the rate does
not greatly exceed the rate permitted in California.
C The Governmental Interest Approach
Although Ury, Gamer, Rochester, and Sarlot-Kantarjian are im-
portant and have been discussed in some detail because they are the
only recent authority involving California Usury Law and choice-of-
law policies, it is not certain whether they would be strictly followed if
the issue were to be considered by the California Supreme Court. Sev-
eral recent California Supreme Court decisions hold, at least in tort
cases, that mechanical application of the principles set forth in the Re-
statement (Second) is no longer the accepted response to a problem
203. Id at 917 n.1. Under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the court was
required to apply California law in order to resolve the conflict-of-laws issue.
204. 599 F.2d at 917.
205. Id at 918.
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involving conflict of laws.2" 6 The California Supreme Court now re-
quires the courts to "'determine the law that most appropriately ap-
plies to the issue involved' "207 based on a careful analysis of the
respective interests of the litigants and the states involved.20 8 The gov-
ernmental interest approach has not yet been specifically applied to
commercial loan transactions when choice-of-law issues are involved,
but it has been applied consistently in other areas 20 9 and its concepts
appear to have broad application.
In these recent cases, the California Supreme Court has given spe-
cial attention to the actual interests of the concerned states and of the
parties in the resolution of the particular issues involved in such cases.
Although not framed in terms of forum interest, the discussion of pub-
lic policy in Gamer is consistent with this standard. In Reich v. Pur-
cell,21 0 the California Supreme Court stated the proper approach to a
conflicts problem in a multistate tort situation as follows:
In a complex situation involving multi-state contacts,
however, no single state alone can be deemed to create exclu-
sively governing rights. The forum must search to find the
proper law to apply based upon the interests of the litigants
and the involved states.21 '
The court began with the premise that the law of the forum will be
displaced only if there is a compelling reason for doing so. However,
the court need not disregard relevant contacts with other states and the
parties' contractual choice of a certain state's law. Rather, the transac-
tion's contacts and the choice-of-law clause are directly relevant to the
"interests of the litigants" to be examined together with the respective
interests of the states involved in the transaction. Recent decisions in-
dicate that in applying the governmental interest approach, California
courts will attempt to avoid frustrating the policies of other states when
possible.
The California Supreme Court decisions also indicate a willing-
206. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 148 Cal. Rptr.
867, 583 P.2d 721 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 215, cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
207. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 316, 546 P.2d 719, 720-21, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215, 216-17, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976) (quoting Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 555,
432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (1967)).
208. Id at 316, 546 P.2d at 720, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
209. See Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1974); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Traynor,
supra note 168, at 668-70.
210. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
211. Id at 553, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (citations omitted).
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ness to define narrowly the interests embodied in a given California
law in the face of broader policy considerations and the need to do
justice in the individual case.212 Although not expressly decided on the
basis of the governmental interest approach, both Gamer and Ury evi-
dence this same willingness. With respect to usury, California courts
have traditionally considered forum policy in the context of a broad
policy of validation of contracts based on the justified expectations of
the parties and have upheld such transactions when the selected state
had a reasonable relationship to the transaction. Although thetheories
articulated by the courts have varied, prior decisions indicate that Cali-
fornia's interest in opposing usury is not the only state policy to be
considered in a choice-of-law decision. As Gamer indicates, a policy
against usury is not necessarily a policy against the particular rate of
interest under all circumstances and the parties' choice-of-law is a ma-
jor factor to be considered in determining whether to apply California
law. Moreover, as evidenced by Ury, California's interest in the appli-
cation of its usury laws to a particular loan transaction should vary
inversely with the ability of the borrower to protect himself and the
degree of legitimate contacts with another forum.
The enactment of Proposition 2 provides an opportunity to ex-
amine the application of the governmental interest approach in light of
the significant changes in the California Usury Law. Although it is
unlikely that the enactment of Proposition 2 will change the result in
most choice-of-law cases, it does add substantial support to the con-
cepts set forth in Ury, Gamer, and Sarlot-Kantarjian. It should also
provide a reliable basis for applying the governmental interest ap-
proach to future loan transactions.
The most recent California Supreme Court decisions applying the
governmental interest approach are Bernhard v. Harrah's Club2" 3 and
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.214 The plaintiff in Bernhard
was injured in California when his motorcycle collided with a car
driven by an individual who had previously been served alcohol at the
defendant Harrah's Club in Nevada and who was allegedly driving
negligently while under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries and
sought to recover under the California rule which imposes civil liability
212. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 319-22, 546 P.2d 719, 722-24, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215, 218-20, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588,
594-96, 360 P.2d 906, 909-10, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269-70 (1961); People v. One 1953 Ford
Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 598-99, 311 P.2d 480, 482-83 (1957).
213. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
214. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
[Vol. 13
USURY L4WS
on one who knowingly serves an intoxicated person. Nevada does not
impose such liability, and the defendant argued that the tort, if any,
was committed in Nevada and that the law of its domicile should con-
trol its liability. After observing that the laws of California and Ne-
vada were not identical with respect to the issue involved, the court
examined the interests of the respective states to determine if the appar-
ent difference was a "false conflict." Concluding that each state had an
interest in applying its law to the resolution of the issue, the California
Supreme Court for the first time found itself faced with a "true" con-
flict between two policies.2" 5 Nevada's policy of protecting tavern
keepers from liability could not be carried out if California's interest in
protecting the public against excessive use of alcohol was enforced.
Both states had legitimate and significant contacts with the dispute:
Nevada as the place where the liquor was served and the defendant
resided; California as the place where the injury occurred and the
plaintiff resided.
The supreme court did not merely recite that the governmental
interest theory would call for the application of forum law in a "true"
conflict situation. Instead, the court considered the degree to which the
interests and policies of the respective states would be infringed upon
by a refusal to apply theiri law. Under this "comparative impairment"
test, the court decided that California could not achieve its policy un-
less its statute were applied to out-of-state tavern owners who actively
sought California business. The court deliberately limited its decision
to those tavern keepers "who regularly and purposely sell intoxicating
beverages to California residents in places and under conditions in
which it is reasonably certain these residents will return to Califor-
nia."21 6 Thus, the court limited the impact of its decision so that it
would not necessarily apply to all Nevada tavern keepers. The court
also recognized that Nevada had criminal statutes making it unlawful
to sell intoxicating liquors to any person who is drunk, and thus the
application of the California law imposing civil liability would not im-
pose an entirely new duty on the tavern keepers.2" 7 Since the impair-
ment of Nevada policy was slight in the court's view, it applied the
California rule.
The analytical procedure employed by the California Supreme
Court in Bernhard appears to involve at least three steps: (1) an analy-
sis of the applicable law of every state reasonably connected with the
215. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d at 319, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
216. Id at 322-23, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
217. Id at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
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transaction to determine whether an apparent conflict exists; (2) a criti-
cal examination of the interests of the litigants and the policies of the
involved states to determine if a "false" conflict exists; and (3) a further
analysis of the comparative impairment of the respective state interests
and policies to resolve "true" conflicts. It is significant that the court in
Bernhard declined to follow the orthodox view of the governmental
interest approach and apply forum law in a "true" conflicts situation.
Instead, it indicated that
the "comparative impairment" approach to the resolution of
such conflict seeks to determine which state's interest would
be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy
of the other state. This analysis proceeds on the principle that
true conflicts should be resolved by applying the law of the
state whose interest would be the more impaired if its law
were not applied. Exponents of this process of analysis em-
phasize that it is very different from a weighing process. The
court does not "'weigh' the conflicting governmental interests
in the sense of determining which conflicting law manifested
the 'better' or the 'worthier' social policy on the specific issue.
An attempted balancing of conflicting state policies in that
sense. . . is difficult to justify in the context of a federal sys-
tem in which, within constitutional limits, states are empow-
ered to mold their policies as they wish. . . . [The process]
can accurately be described as . . . accommodation of con-
flicting state policies, as a problem of allocating domains of
law-making power in multi-state contexts-limitations on the
reach of state policies-as distinguished from evaluating the
wisdom of those policies . . . . [E]mphasis is placed on the
appropriate scope of conflicting state policies rather than on
the 'quality' of those policies ... ."28
It is clear that both step 2 and step 3 in the court's analysis require
a critical examination of the scope of the policy of the forum state; to
state that the transaction would have been invalid in the forum state is
simply not sufficient. Instead, the forum should "reexamine its policy
to determine if a more restricted interpretation of it is more appropri-
ate."2 9 This reexamination process includes not only an analysis of
218. Id at 320-21, 546 P.2d at 723-24, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20 (quoting Horowitz, The
Law of Choice of Law in Caifornia-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719, 753 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Horowitz]).
219. Id at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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the particular forum policy that creates the apparent conflict but also
an analysis of other competingforum policies.
In a usury context, this means that the court must undertake not
only a detailed examination of California usury policy, but also a re-
view of a number of other California policies relating to the validity of
contracts generally. Such other policies include interpreting a contract
so that it is lawful and capable of being carried into effect, providing
certainty, uniformity and upholding the reasonable expectations of par-
ties to commercial agreements, regulating the activities of certain lend-
ing institutions and encouraging the flow of capital into California
thereby lowering interest rates and creating employment. The object of
this analysis is to determine the aggregate California interest which, in
"true" conflicts situations, would then be compared with the aggregate
policy of the other state pursuant to the "comparative impairment" test
set forth in Bernhard. Although the process may appear to be unduly
complex and subjective, it responds surprisingly easily to analysis if
taken one step at a time.
In applying the governmental interest approach to commercial
loan transactions, it appears that the three-step process employed in
Bernhard22 0 may, perhaps, be more easily analyzed if it is expanded
into a five-step procedure: (1) a determination of whether California as
a forum has any interest in the matter, tie., the "false" conflict issue; (2)
if California is determined to have an interest, an examination of the
quality and the quantity of the forum contacts which create that inter-
est; (3) an analysis of the scope and extent of the basic forum policy at
issue, le., the strength of the California policy against usury; (4) an
analysis of competing forum policies that may contradict or ameliorate
the California policy against usury; and (5) an analysis of the compara-
tive impairment of the aggregate forum policy with the impairment of
the policy of the chosen state or the state with the most significant com-
peting interest.
As indicated above, the first step is to determine whether there are
sufficient contacts with California to give it, as the forum state, an inter-
est in applying its law to the transaction. However strong California's
usury policy might be in the abstract, it has no application unless the
parties or the transaction have some minimal contact with California.
Since the purpose of usury laws is to protect certain borrowers,221 nor-
mally it will be sufficient to create a forum interest if the transaction
involves a California borrower. If the transaction involves a California
220. See notes 213-219 supra and accompanying text.
221. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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lender or other California contacts (such as the location of collateral)
but does not involve a California borrower, a "false" conflict is created
and California should have no interest in applying forum law to the
transaction, unless of course, the parties voluntarily choose California
law in their contract. Conversely, the transaction must have sufficient
contacts with some other state in order to give such state a legitimate
interest in the application of its law. Normally the domicile of the
lender will be sufficient to create such an interest, but this factor may
not be essential, especially in transactions involving multiple lenders.
In such transactions, the parties may wish to choose the law of a state
where an agent or trustee for the lenders is located, or perhaps they will
find it necessary or convenient to choose the law of some respected
"neutral" state that has a well developed body of commercial law.222
In such instances, the parties' express choice of a governing law, to-
gether with some other relevant contacts (such as closing, funding, or
repayment) should be sufficient to create the appropriate "nexus" and
resulting governmental interest of such state in applying its law to the
transaction.
Assuming California is found to have an interest in the transac-
tion, the second step requires an analysis of the quality and quantity of
the contacts which create that interest. In a narrow sense, a state
should only be concerned with activities that occur within its borders.
In the broadest sense, a state may have an interest in protecting its citi-
zens and residents wherever they may elect to engage in business. Both
extremes seem unworkable in the context of a modern, mobile soci-
ety.223 Thus, the forum must "search to find the proper law to apply
based on the interests of the litigants and the involved states." 224 For
example, although the fact that a California borrower is involved in the
transaction may be sufficient to create an interest in the application of
California law, the strength of that interest may depend on the type of
borrower involved and the degree to which that borrower needs the
protection of the California usury laws. Is a large multinational corpo-
ration headquartered in California to be treated the same as an individ-
ual resident? Does it make a difference whether the proceeds of the
loan will be used for personal, family, or household purposes or for
commercial purposes? How much weight should be given to the ex-
press choice of law by the parties? Did the borrower have the advice of
counsel available? What about other "contacts," such as the place of
222. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
223. See Horowitz, supra note 218, at 753.
224. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 553, 432 P.2d 727, 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33 (1967).
[Vol. 13
USURYL4WS
negotiations, the site of the closing, the location of the collateral, and
the place of repayment? Under the traditional approaches to choice-of-
law problems, these factors often determined which state's law was to
be applied to the transaction.225 Under the governmental interest ap-
proach, these factors remain an integral part of the analysis, but instead
they help to define the extent of the forum interest and to determine the
scope of the forum policy which should then be reviewed in light of the
policies of the other involved states and the express choice of the par-
ties.226
Proposition 2 provides a basis for evaluating the relative impor-
tance of these contacts. For example, Proposition 2 makes a clear dis-
tinction between loans for personal, family, and household purposes
and all other loans. Thus, California's interest in protecting individual
borrowers should be stronger than its interest in protecting corporate or
commercial borrowers. Likewise, the entire thrust of the governmental
interest approach is to examine relevant forum interests and policies,
not mechanical contacts. Consequently, methodically comparing the
number of telephone calls or meetings that occurred in California with
those that occurred elsewhere or requiring corporate directors to fly to
another state for board meetings seems both transparent and legally
irrelevant. If a California borrower is involved, it should be assumed
that some negotiations and most internal administrative procedures
will occur in California. The situs of these activites should not be
viewed as significant because they should be deemed to be included
inherently in the context of a transaction involving a California bor-
rower. On the other hand, the location of legally significant actions,
such as the execution of documents, the disbursement of funds, and the
repayment of amounts borrowed should be considered in determining
the strength of the forum interest. While such factors may not be as
important as the residence of the parties and their deliberate selection
of a particular law to govern their respective rights and obligations,
such factors do have a substantial tradition of being included in choice-
of-law analyses and are thus likely to continue to be reflected in the
governmental interest approach. Thus, California's interest should di-
minish if a substantial portion of such events occurs outside California.
The third step is to analyze the scope and extent of the forum in-
terest. With respect to usury, it seems clear that California's policy is
one of providing flexible protection for certain borrowers in need of
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 188, supra note 173.
226. Dixon Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Walters, 48 Cal. App. 3d 964, 122 Cal. Rptr. 202
(1975).
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such protection and that California does not have a strict policy of op-
position to interest rates in excess of a certain per annum amount.227
California banks and savings and loan associations are essentially un-
regulated in setting interest rates, even for consumer transactions.228
Licensed personal property brokers are also essentially unregulated
with respect to commercial loans in excess of $5,000 and all loans in
excess of $10,000.229 Even consumer loans of less than $10,000 may
bear interest as high as 2.5% per month, depending on the amount of
the loan.23° Other statutes, such as the Unruh Act, permit finance
charges as high as 1.5% per month.231 The enactment of Proposition 2
with its higher rate for nonpersonal loans continues and expands this
tradition. The common thread throughout California's Usury Law ap-
pears to be that the desired protection is best supplied not by regulating
interest rates but instead by regulating the persons or entities who en-
gage in the money-lending business. This objective is accomplished by
exempting certain lenders from the Usury Law, establishing a licensing
procedure, and granting to the legislature the power to regulate such
lenders if it deems regulation necessary.232 Even such regulation as
does exist seems primarily accented toward licensing procedures and
disclosure requirements instead of rate regulation. Although in some
cases California courts have sought to establish the state's power to reg-
ulate out-of-state lenders,233 for the most part the legislature has estab-
lished a policy of encouraging such lenders to participate in California
lending activity without being subject to licensing requirements or
other undue regulation. 3 These concepts are further strengthened by
the enactment of Proposition 2 and lead to the conclusion that Califor-
nia does not have a strong public policy against rates that are not
greatly in excess of the rates permitted by the Usury Law, especially if a
similar loan could have been made by a California exempt lender. As
indicated above, Ury, Gamer, and section 203 of the Restatement (Sec-
227. Garner v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 287, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230,
234 (1976); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 20-21, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376,
382-83 (1964).
228. See note 22 supra.
229. CAL. FIN. CODE § 22053 (West 1968).
230. Id. §§ 22451, 22451.5 (West Supp. 1979).
231. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1810.2 (West 1973).
232. See Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949); Ops, Cal.
Att'y Gen. No. 80-122 (April 29, 1980).
233. See, e.g., People v. Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 47 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1964), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 1 (1965).




ond) reach a similar conclusion.235 Thus, California's interest in apply-
ing its Usury Law should diminish as the need for protection of the
borrower diminishes.
The fourth step involves an analysis of other competing forum pol-
icies that must be weighed with California usury policy to determine
the aggregate forum policy. The policy of upholding contracts when-
ever possible and protecting the reasonable expectation of the parties
finds support in several California statutes23 6 and in numerous Califor-
nia cases.237 An example of such a case is Bernkrant v. Fowler,238 cited
with approval by the court in Bernhard.239 The plaintiffs in Bernkrant
owned an apartment house in Las Vegas, Nevada, encumbered by a
deed of trust in favor of Mr. Granrud. In 1954, at Granrud's request,
plaintiffs refinanced the property and prepaid a portion of the obliga-
tion to Granrud. Granrud orally agreed that upon his death the bal-
ance of the obligation would be cancelled. Granrud died two years
later, a resident of California, and his will made no provision for can-
celling the obligation. Plaintiffs continued payments to Granrud's es-
tate under protest while they brought an action to enforce the oral
promise to have the note cancelled and discharged and the second deed
of trust released and reconveyed.
The California Supreme Court concluded that the oral promise
was enforceable under the Nevada statute of frauds although it would
have been unenforceable in California. Chief Justice Traynor said the
following regarding the choice-of-law problem:
The contract was made in Nevada and performed by
plaintiffs there, and it involved the refinancing of obligations
arising from the sale of Nevada land and secured by interests
therein. Nevada has a substantial interest in the contract and
in protecting the rights of its residents who are parties thereto,
and its policy is that the contract is valid and enforceable.
California's policy is also to enforce lawful contracts ...
Since there is thus no conflict between the law of California
and the law of Nevada, we can give effect to the common pol-
icy of both states to enforce lawful contracts and sustain Ne-
vada's interest in protecting its residents and their reasonable
235. See, e.g., text accompanying note 198 supra.
236. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1643, 3541 (West 1973); CAL. COM. CODE
§§ 1102(2)(b), 1102(3), 1105(1) (West 1964).
237. See, e.g., Barham v. Barham, 33 Cal. 2d 416, 429, 202 P.2d 289, 297 (1949); Moss
Dev. Co. v. Geary, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9-10, 115 Cal. Rptr. 736, 742 (1974).
238. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
239. 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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expectations growing out of a transaction substantially related
to that state without subordinating any legitimate interest of
this state.240
Bernkrant suggests that, under the governmental interest ap-
proach, California should be regarded as having an interest in protect-
ing the "reasonable expectations" of the parties arising out of a
commercial transaction that is "substantially related" to the chosen
state. This suggestion, as Gamer noted, is supported by section 1105(1)
of the California Commercial Code, which expressly provides that
"when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and du-
ties."24
Although, as Gamer acknowledged, it is likely that this provision is
directly applicable only to California Commercial Code transactions,
the provision does indicate the general policy of California to recognize
a stipulated choice of law in the commercial area. One commentator
has stated that
the enactment by the legislature of this provision should be
viewed in broader perspective as well: The adoption of a
multistate policy by which to resolve a conflict of the laws of
states each of which has a "reasonable relation[ship]" (i.e., an
interest in having its policy applied) to the transaction. That
principle-giving effect to a "private" declaration as to which
law should govern-can soundly be applied, as a legislatively-
declared "precedent," to other planned bilateral transac-
tions. 242
Several recent cases also suggest that the need for certainty and
uniformity in commercial transactions is a factor that deserves consid-
eration in determining forum policy.243 The enactment of the Califor-
nia Commercial Code and other Uniform Acts evidences this same
policy.2" In fact, in financial transactions that have contacts with sev-
eral states, the need for certainty with respect to the governing law is
240. 55 Cal. 2d at 595-96, 360 P.2d at 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
241. CAL. COM. CODE § 1105(l) (West Supp. 1979).
242. Horowitz, supra note 218, at 768.
243. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
244. See LARMAC, INDEX TO CALIFORNIA LAWS 972-73 (1979). California has also estab-
lished a Commission on Uniform State Laws whose purpose is "to promote uniformity in
State laws upon all subjects where uniformity is deemed desirable and practicable." CAL.
Gov. CODE §§ 10400-10433 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979).
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likely to be one of the most important factors in determining which law
should apply. In such instances the parties should be able to choose the
law of a state which has a substantial relationship to the transaction in
order to achieve certainty about the extent of their obligations and to
ensure that their efforts have created a valid and binding contract.
A recent United States Supreme Court decision upheld such a
choice when the express contractual provision was the only contact
with the stipulated forum. This case, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co.,245 dealt with a choice-of-forum clause rather than a choice-of-law
provision, but its reasoning and its treatment of the underlying policy
considerations strongly support the conclusion that parties should be
able to enter into commercial and financial transactions with certainty
as to the nature and extent of their obligations.
The case involved a contract to tow an ocean-going, self-elevating
drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy. The contract stipulated that the
London Court of Justice was to have jurisdiction over any dispute
under the contract. The drilling rig was damaged in a storm in the
Gulf of Mexico, and the rig's owner commenced an action for damages
in the United States District Court despite the provision in the contract.
Additional litigation occurred between the parties, both in the district
court and in the London Court of Justice, and the district court subse-
quently enjoined the tug owner from proceeding further in the London
Court of Justice. On appeal by the tug owner, the court of appeals
affirmed and certiorari was granted by the United States Surpeme
Court.
The Court held that when an American company with special ex-
pertise contracted with a foreign company, which was also experienced
and sophisticated in business, for towing a complex machine thousands
of miles across the ocean, and a clause providing that such disputes be
heard only before the London Court of Justice was a part of such con-
tract, the choice-of-forum clause was prima facie valid. The clause was
to be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts in the absence
of some compelling countervailing reasons making enforcement unrea-
sonable. Significantly, the fact that the London Court would enforce
exculpatory clauses invalid under American law was not a compelling
reason for denying enforcement. The Zapata decision's emphasis on
the fact that the clause was agreed to by sophisticated parties who had
substantial negotiating experience and who were able to look out for
themselves suggests that other courts, including those in California,
245. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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would likewise enforce similar choices of commercial parties.246
A recent decision of the California Supreme Court further sup-
ports this argument. In Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior
Court,247 the court considered a contract appointing a local agent for a
Philadelphia insurer. The contract contained a reciprocal choice-of-
forum clause, whereby the agent agreed to bring actions on the agree-
ment only in Philadelphia and the insurer agreed to bring all such ac-
tions in Los Angeles. After a dispute arose, the agent initiated an
action in California despite the clause. After the trial court dismissed
the action because of the choice-of-forum clause, the plaintiff agent ar-
gued that such clauses violated California public policy and were unen-
forceable.
The California Supreme Court, although noting the "policy favor-
ing access to California courts by resident plaintiffs,"24 8 concluded
"that the policy is satisfied in those cases where .. .a plaintiff has
freely and voluntarily negotiated away his right to a California fo-
rum."249 The court, citing Zapata, noted the "modern trend" favoring
enforcement of forum selection clauses in contracts "entered into freely
and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's length" and
ruled that enforcement of such clauses was within the trial court's dis-
cretion.2
50
Perhaps more relevant to the issues involved in this discussion is
the court's initial statement that, because the agreement contained a
choice of Pennsylvania law and "[s]uch choice of law provisions are
usually respected by California courts,"'251 the Pennsylvania policy of
enforcing reasonable forum selection clauses should apply. The court's
analysis of California law revealed no different standard, and the
choice-of-law issue was not discussed further. The court did, however,
cite, with apparent approval, the statement from Windsor Mills, Inc. v.
Collins & iMan Corp.,252 that choice-of-law provisions, even those in
printed forms used by commercial parties, are usually respected.253
The Gamer court cited this apparent approval as reaffirmation of the
246. Cf. Berard Constr. Co. v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 710, 721-22, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 825, 832-33 (1975) (parties may contract in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a
given court).
247. 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976).
248. Id at 495, 551 P.2d at 1209, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
249. Id
250. Id at 495-96, 551 P.2d at 1209, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
251. Id at 494, 551 P.2d at 1208, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
252. 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 995 n.6, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 352 n.6 (1972).
253. Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 494, 551 P.2d
1206, 1208, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (1976).
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policy to respect parties' choice-of-law provisions." 4
In addition to these general policies respecting the validity of con-
tracts, there is also substantial evidence of specific California policies
favoring commercial loans and real estate loans and encouraging cer-
tain activities by foreign lenders.255 For example, California Corpora-
tions Code sections 191 and 2104 exempt certain foreign lending
institutions from many California regulations including licensing,
qualification to do business in California, and taxation. 6 Section 1757
of the California Financial Code, cited by the court in Sondeno,257 ex-
empts foreign banking institutions from licensing requirements that
might otherwise be applicable with respect to real estate loans. Finally,
the provisions of Proposition 2 which entitle certain real estate loans to
the higher rate of interest and which totally exempt loans made or ar-
ranged by licensed real estate brokers suggest a special concern for real
estate loans. The ballot arguments confirm that Proposition 2 was in-
tended to encourage increased investment in California, thereby lower-
ing interest rates.258 As indicated at the beginning of this article, there
were some preliminary indications that, but for the intervention of fed-
eral monetary policy, such expectations were being realized.25 9
All of these general policies relating to upholding the validity of
contracts and the specific policies relating to encouraging the activities
of certain foreign lenders must be weighed with California usury policy
to determine the aggregate California interest. Depending on the facts
of the case, a court might well conclude that the aggregate California
policy is to uphold the transaction. Because this conclusion is consis-
tent with the express choice of the parties and the interest of the other
state, there would be no need to engage in a comparative impairment
analysis. On the other hand, if it is concluded that California has an
interest in applying its Usury Law to the transaction, Bernhard requires
that such interest be compared with the interest of the other state to
determine which interest will be more impaired by the application of
the other state's law.260 The final step, therefore, involves a compara-
254. Garner v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 286-87, 135 Cal. Rptr.
230, 233 (1976).
255. These policies are also reflected at the federal level by the enactment of the Deposi-
tory Institutions Act.
256. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 191(d), 2104 (West 1977).
257. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
258. California Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 6, 1979), at 12.
259. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
260. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
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tive impairment analysis of the California Usury Law and the law of
the state chosen by the parties. Most states have usury laws that specifi-
cally exempt corporate borrowers, transactions in excess of certain
amounts, and certain real estate loans261 and this discussion has as-
sumed that the transaction at issue would be valid under the laws of the
chosen state. It seems reasonable to assume that most states likewise
have policies in favor of upholding the validity of contracts and provid-
ing certainty and uniformity for the interpretation of commercial
agreements. A restrictive California usury policy could deprive the
lenders in such states from access to the California market and deprive
California borrowers from access to capital and funds needed for busi-
ness and development, thereby impairing the interest of such states
without advancing any significant California policy. The governmental
interest approach, therefore, permits the anticipated flexibility in Cali-
fornia Usury Law intended by Proposition 2 to be likewise reflected in
choice-of-law analysis, validating the great majority of legitimate trans-
actions while protecting the interests of the borrower in need of such
protection. So long as the transaction is valid in the chosen state, has a
reasonable relationship with the chosen state, and does not involve a
loan for personal, family, or household purposes, there should be no
overriding forum interest that requires the application of California
law.
V. RECENT FEDERAL USURY LEGISLATION
On March 31, 1980, President Carter signed the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.262 The De-
pository Institutions Act is the latest and most comprehensive in a
series of recent federal laws attempting to respond to the problems cre-
ated by rapidly escalating interest rates.263 It became effective April 1,
1980 and preempted state usury laws264 in four significant areas.
261. For a summary of state usury laws, see I CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 510, at 1309-
17 (April 29, 1980).
262. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 [hereinafter cited as the Depository Institutions Act
or the Act].
263. See note 45 supra. In addition, in order to implement federal monetary policy
designed to control inflation, the Federal Reserve Board has issued a series of regulations
affecting consumer credit. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 17,927 (1980) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R.
Part 229). However, on April 17, 1980 the Board indicated that such regulations were not
intended to preempt state usury laws. Federal Reserve Board Press Release (April 17, 1980).
264. Most state usury laws provide for both civil and criminal penalties. See, e.g., CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1916-3 (West 1980). A question might be raised whether the preemption was




Section 501(a)(1) of the Depository Institutions Act preempts state
usury ceilings on first mortgage loans on residential real property made
by specified institutional lenders.26 The states, -however, are granted -
the power to override the preemption if they act within three years.
266
Any such law enacted to override the federal usury preemption, how-
ever, must do so expressly and will not be effective with respect to com-
mitments issued prior to such enactment even though the loans are
clearly seems broad enough to include criminal usury laws, and any other result would seem
illogical.
265. Section 501(a)(1) provides as follows:
The provisions of the constitution or the laws of any State expressly limiting
the rate or amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges
which may be charged, taken, received, or reserved shall not apply to any loan,
mortgage, credit sale, or advance which is-
(A) secured by a first lien on residential real property, by a first lien on stock
in a residential cooperative housing corporation where the loan, mortgage, or ad-
vance is used to finance the acquisition of such stock, or by a first lien on a residen-
tial manufactured home;
(B) made after March 31, 1980; and
(C) described in section 527(b) of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.
1735f-5(b)), except that for the purpose of this section-
(i) the limitation described in section 527(b)(1) of such Act that the
property must be designed principally for the occupancy of from one to four fami-
lies shall not apply;
(ii) the requirement contained in section 527(b)(1) of such Act that the
loan be secured by residential real property shall not apply to a loan secured by
stock in a residential cooperative housing corporation or to a loan or credit sale
secured by a first lien on a residential manufactured home;
(iii) the term "federally related mortgage loan" in section 527(b) of
such Act shall include a credit sale which is secured by a first lien on a residential
manufactured home and which otherwise meets the definitional requirements of
section 527(b) of such Act, as those requirements are modified by this section;
(iv) the term "residential loans" in section 527(b)(2)(D) of such Act
shall also include loans or credit sales secured by a first lien on a residential manu-
factured home;
(v) the requirement contained in section 527(b)(2)(D) of such Act that
a creditor make or invest in loans aggregating more than $1,000,000 per year shall
not apply to a creditor selling residential manufactured homes financed by loans or
credit sales secured by first liens on residential manufactured homes if the creditor
has an arrangement to sell such loans or credit sales in whole or in part, or if such
loans or credit sales are sold in whole or in part to a lender, institution, or creditor
described in section 527(b) of such Act or in this section or a creditor, as defined in
section 103(f) of the Truth in Lending Act, as such section was in effect on the day
preceding the date of enactment of this title, if such creditor makes or invests in
residential real estate loans or loans or credit sales secured by first liens on residen-
tial manufactured homes aggregating more than $1,000,000 per year, and
(vi) the term "lender" in section 527(b)(2)(A) of such Act shall also be
deemed to include any lender approved by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development for participation in any mortgage insurance program under the Na-
tional Housing Act.
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501(a)(l), 94 Stat. at 161.
266. Id § 501(b)(2), 94 Stat. at 162.
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funded after the effective date of such enactment.267 If the states do not
act within three years, the preemption becomes permanent.
The preemption applies to any state law limiting the rate or
amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges
which may be charged, taken, received or reserved with respect to such
loans, and the Act does not specify any interest rate limitation for such
loans. In order to be entitled to the preemption, such loans must be
secured by first liens on residential real property, stock in a residential
cooperative housing corporation, or a residential manufactured
home.268 The loan must be made after March 31, 1980 and be a "feder-
ally related mortgage loan" as that term is defined in section 527(b) of
the National Housing Act.269 However, section 501(a)(1)(C) removes
several restrictions and substantially broadens the definition of "feder-
ally related mortgage loans" with the result that most "conventional"
first mortgage loans made by institutional lenders on residential real
property will be entitled to the usury preemption.27 °
The Depository Institutions Act authorizes the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board to issue rules and regulations and to publish inter-
pretations governing the implementation of section 501 of the Act.27'
On April 3, 1980, the Board adopted a series of regulations implement-
ing section 501 of the Act.2 72 It defined residential real property as
property "improved or to be improved by a structure or structures
designed primarily for dwelling, as opposed to commercial use" 273 and
concluded that there is no limitation on the number of dwelling units
267. Id § 501(b)(3), 94 Stat. at 162.
268. Id § 501(a)(l), 94 Stat. at 161.
269. See 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5(b) (1976).
270. It should be noted, however, that sellers of residential real property who finance such
sale by "taking back" a note for the balance of the purchase price may not be covered by
§ 501 even if such note is secured by a first mortgage. However, in California, such sellers
would not be subject to the Usury Law as a result of the application of the time-price doc-
trine. See note 124 supra and accompanying text. In addition, many real estate brokers may
not be qualified lenders for purposes of § 501(a)(1). However, loans by brokers should be
covered by Proposition 2. See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text. Congress was
apparently aware that sellers of real property and loans by real estate brokers were not
covered by § 501(a)(1). See 126 CONG. REC. H2280 (daily ed. March 27, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. St Germain).
271. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501(f), 94 Stat. at 163.
272. 45 Fed. Reg. 24,112 (1980) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. Part 590). These regulations
replace the regulations issued under Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233,
but the Board has indicated that it will continue to adhere to the positions taken in such
regulations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 2,840 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 6,165 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 8,000
(1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15,921 (1980).
273. 45 Fed. Reg. 24,112, 24,114 (1980) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 590.2(e)).
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contained in the structure.27 4 Accordingly, a question has arisen
whether construction loans for multi-unit apartment buildings are ex-
empted from state usury ceilings. Although there is legislative history,
which suggests that some members of Congress may have considered
such loans to be business loans governed by section 511 instead of resi-
dential loans covered by section 501,275 the regulations seem to reach a
contrary conclusion. The Board's interpretation is consistent with the
basic policy of the federal usury law in promoting the construction and
financing of residential housing,2 76 and it is also consistent with previ-
ous federal usury legislation.277 Thus, the better view seems to be that
construction loans for residential apartment projects are included in the
usury preemption.
There are a number of other questions raised by the Act. To what
extent will existing state law determine what types of transactions con-
stitute "loans" and what types of charges constitute "interest?" For ex-
ample, section 501(a)(1) refers to any "loan, mortgage, credit sale or
advance" but does not use the word "forbearance." Are forbearances
included? Most state usury laws apply to both loans and forbearances
274. Id at 24,113.
275. On March 27, 1980, Congressmen St Germain and Mattox engaged in the following
colloquy:
Mr. MATTOX.
Does a loan issued to a builder for the construction of commercial property
like a shopping center, for instance, constitute a business loan within the definition
of the statute?
Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MATTOX. I yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WYLIE)
pointed out, the answer is: Absolutely.
Mr. MATTOX. Mr. Speaker, the next question is this: Does a loan issued to
a builder, a homebuilder, for the purpose of constructing residential dwellings for
the purpose of resale to homebuyers constitute a business loan, or is it a residential
loan?
Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, this would be business financing. It is a
business loan in that there is indeed interim financing: Therefore, it would be a
business loan.
126 CoNG. REC. H2291 (daily ed. March 27, 1980).
276. See 125 CONG. REC. S18959 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1979); 125 CONG. REc. S19163
(daily ed. Dec. 19, 1979). It is difficult to believe that Congress intended to stimulate jobs in
residential construction by making permanent mortgage funds available while not making
construction funds available on the same terms. Section 528 of the Depository Institutions
Act also provides that if one or more provisions of the Act or other federal statutes apply
with respect to the same loan, the loan may be made at the highest applicable rate. Thus,
the fact that a construction loan may be a "business" loan under § 511 does not mean that it
could not also be a residential loan under § 501.
277. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1709-la (1976) (temporary construction loans or other interim
financing for projects to be permanently financed by FHA and VA loans are included in the
federal usury preemption).
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and it would seem illogical to exempt loans but not forbearances. 278
Section 501(a)(1) also refers to "interest, discount points, finance
charges or other charges," but it does not specify what "other charges"
are included. What about commissions, late charges, prepayment pen-
alties, attorneys' fees, closing costs, etc.? California has enacted a
number of statutes regulating or limiting the amount of such
charges.279 Are such statutes preempted by the Depository Institutions
Act? The answer should be that such questions should be determined
by state law28° and that if such charges are not interest under state law,
they should not be preempted by section 501. Accordingly, consumer
protection statutes regulating closing costs, late charges, prepayment
penalties, and similar charges probably remain valid, notwithstanding
the federal preemption of state usury laws.28 '
To what extent may lenders with existing commitments take ad-
vantage of the new federal usury provisions? May they now fund loans
at rates that would have been usurious prior to April 1, 1980? Al-
though section 501(a)(1) refers to loans "made" after March 31, 1980,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has apparently concluded that the
usury preemption does not apply to loans for which commitments were
made prior to the effective date of the Act but which are to be funded
after April 1, 1980.282 It noted that commitments made between De-
cember 28, 1979 and March 31, 1980 were exempted from state interest
ceilings by Public Law 96-161 and concluded that commitments not
covered by Public Law 96-161 or commitments made prior to Decem-
ber 28, 1979 continue to be governed by state law even if funded after
April 1, 1980. This result seems contrary to the express language of
278. Under California law, "interest" is defined as "the compensation allowed by law or
fixed by the parties for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1915 (West 1980) (emphasis added). Thus, if federal law preempts state usury laws with
respect to "interest," such preemption should apply to both loans and forbearances.
279. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2954.4 (late charges), 2954.9 (prepayment penalties)
(West 1980); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10242 (expenses and charges), 10242.5 (late
charges), 10242.6 (prepayment penalties) (West 1967 and Supp. 1980).
280. Such charges are usually determined not to be "interest" for usury purposes. See,
e.g., Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 845 (1973) (late charges); Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971) (prepayment penalties); Haines v. Com-
mercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956, 255 P. 805 (1927) (expenses and closing
costs).
281. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has reached a similar conclusion. Regulation
§ 590.3(c) provides that federal law does not preempt "limitation[s] in state laws on prepay-
ment charges, attorneys fees, late charges or other provision designed to protect borrowers."
45 Fed. Reg. 24,112, 24,114 (1980) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 590.3(c)).
282. Id at 24,113.
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section 501(a)(1) and the intent of some members of Congress. 283 Until
the law is clarified, however, lenders should carefully consider the risks
involved in attempting to fund prior commitments at rates in excess of
those permitted by state usury laws. The parties should, however, be
able to amend existing commitments and to refinance existing loans in
order to take advantage of the new law.284
B. Business and Agricultural Loans
Section 511 of the Depository Institutions Act preempts state usury
laws with respect to business and agricultural loans in the amount of
$25,000 or more.285 In contrast to loans made under section 501, loans
may be made by any "person," not just certain specified lenders. Such
loans are subject, however, to a maximum interest rate of "5 per cen-
tum in excess of the discount rate, including any surcharge thereon,286
on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank
283. On March 27, 1980, Congressman St Germain responded to a question by Congress-
man Mattox as follows:
Mr. MATTOX. Mr. Speaker, on floating rate loans, on which the interest is
contractually tied to the prime interest rate, plus additional points, and where the
total effective rate ... stipulated in the contract could not be put into effect be-
cause of the existence of State or Federal usury ceilings, could the full effect of the
contract interest rate be utilized on the total loan amount, assuming the enactment
of this legislation and, then, would this rate as stated in the contract be legal?
Mr. ST GERMAIN. Yes, it would.
Mr. MATTOX. Mr. Speaker, let me ask my final question in the form of an
example:
Let us assume that a commitment for a floating rate construction loan, as I
have just described, was made in January 1980, but such loan is not closed until
after the effective date of this act (April 1, 1980). Is the maximum interest rate
"allowed by law" the rate which is in existence at the time of the commitment
(January 1980), or is it the rate in existence at the time of closing (after April 1980)?
Mr. ST GERMAIN. It would be the rate at the time of the closing.
126 CONG. REC. H2291 (daily ed. March 27, 1980).
284. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board concluded that an agreement to refinance an
existing loan would be considered to be a new loan for the purposes of the Act of Dec. 28,
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233. See 45 Fed. Reg. 6,165, 6,166 (1980). A similar
question arises under Proposition 2. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
285. Section 511(a) provides as follows:
If the applicable rate prescribed in this section exceeds the rate a person would
be permitted to charge in the absence of this section, such person may in the case of
a business or agricultural loan in the amount of $25,000 or more, notwithstanding
any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this
section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any such loan, interest at a rate of not
more than 5 per centum in excess of the discount rate, including any surcharge
thereon, on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in
the Federal Reserve district where the person is located.
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 5 11(a), 94 Stat. at 164.
286. On May 7, 1980, the Federal Reserve Board deleted the 3% surcharge imposed on
March 17, 1980. Wall St. J., May 7, 1980, at 2, col. 2. Thus, the maximum rate currently
permitted under the federal law is the same as permitted under Proposition 2.
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in the Federal Reserve district where the person is located." '287 Unlike
section 501, this preemption is temporary and will expire on the earlier
of April 1, 1983 or the date upon which a state enacts a measure ex-
pressly stating that such state does not want [such provisions] to apply
with respect to loans made in such state."2 ' The Act does provide,
however, that commitments for loans made prior to such enactment
will be valid even though the loan is funded after the date of such en-
actment.289 Unlike the authority given to the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board under section 501, no federal agency is given express au-
thority to interpret or implement sections 511 and 512. However, the
language in section 511 had its origins in the Brock Bill, 290 and rulings
and interpretations issued by the Comptroller of the Currency for the
Administrator of National Banks may be useful in interpreting section
511.291
Although many of the basic concepts underlying section 511 seem
similar to the concepts underlying Proposition 2, the language of sec-
tion 511 is different from the language in Proposition 2 in several sig-
nificant respects. For example, section 511 preempts state usury laws
with respect to "business" loans. On the other hand, Proposition 2 per-
mits the parties to agree to a higher rate for loans for uses other than
"personal, family or household" purposes. Are these concepts the
same? It seems probable that the term "business" loans may be con-
strued more narrowly than the definition of nonpersonal loans under
Proposition 2 with the result that real estate loans and loans for invest-
ment purposes, which are nonpersonal loans under Proposition 2, may
not be "business" loans under section 51 1.292 Also, Proposition 2 refers
to a "loan or forbearance" but there is no reference to a "forbearance"
in the federal law. Are forbearances included? As with section 501, the
resolution of this issue may be left to state law.293 Finally, the determi-
nation of the rate-setting date may not be the same under Proposition 2
287. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 511 (a), 94 Stat. at 164.
288. Id § 512, 94 Stat. at 164.
289. Id
290. Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557 (expired July 1, 1977).
291. See, e.g., Letters from Thomas G. DeShazo, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency
(March 12, 1975; March 27, 1975).
292. The Administrator of National Banks, in an unpublished letter, which interpreted
similar language under the "Brock Bill," Act of Oct. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat.
1557 (expired July 1, 1977), concluded that loans for personal investment purposes were not
"business" loans. Letter from Thomas G. DeShazo, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency
(March 27, 1975). See also note 53 supra and accompanying text. But see 126 CONo. REC.
H2286 (daily ed. March 27, 1980).
293. See note 228 supra.
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as it is under section 511. Section 511 refers to loans "made" on or
after April 1, 1980. There is no language similar to the "earlier of'
language in Proposition 2. However, since federal law preempts state
usury laws only if such laws would require a lower rate, for purposes of
determining the applicable maximum rate the parties should be able to
specify the higher of either the maximum rate permitted on the com-
mitment date or the maximum rate permitted on the funding date in
their agreement.294
As with Proposition 2, section 511 permits the parties to enter into
long term, fixed-rate loans at the maximum allowable rate permitted at
the time the loan is made and appears to provide that such loans will be
valid notwithstanding a suibsequent decline in the discount rate.295
May the parties agree to a floating rate loan limited by subsequent
changes in the discount rate? Although section 512 refers to loans
"made" on or after April 1, 1980 and would thus appear to refer to a
single rate-setting date, loans with a floating maximum rate have been
allowed under the National Bank Act, which contains language similar
to section 511.296 Moreover, portions of the congressional debate on
the Act indicate that Congress assumed that maximum floating rate
loans are permitted by section 511.297 However, the rate on such loans
should float down as well as up with changes in the discount rate.298
A question also arises under section 511 with respect to its applica-
tion to existing floating rate loans. May the interest rate on such loans
now be raised to the maximum rate permitted by either state or federal
law? A similar issue was discussed in Section II above2 9 9 with respect
to Proposition 2 and it was concluded there that lenders should be per-
mitted to adjust the interest rate in accordance with the provisions of
the note for the balance of the term of the loan so long as the adjusted
rate does not exceed the maximum rate permitted by Proposition 2. A
similar result apparently was intended by Congress 300 but there is some
294. See note 73 supra.
295. See Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) 85,190 (Aug. 10, 1979).
296. Id A similar question arises under Proposition 2. See notes 74-84 supra and ac-
companying text.
297. See note 283 supra and note 300 infra.
298. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH) 1 85,190 (Aug. 10, 1979).
299. See notes 162-163 supra and accompanying text.
300. On April 21, 1980, Senator Tower referred to such intent and inserted into the Con-
gressional Record the following colloquy between himself and Senator Proxmire that oc-
curred during the Senate passage of the Conference Report for the Depository Institutions
Act:
1979]
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES L,4W REVIEW [Vol. 13
question whether the express language of section 511 permits such ad-
justment. Since section 512 states that the preemption applies only to
loans made during the period beginning on April 1, 1980 and ending
on April 1, 1983 or the date of state override, presumably the preemp-
tion does not apply to loans made prior to the effective date of the Act.
In an attempt to clarify congressional intent on the matter, Senator
John Tower introduced an amendment to section 512,301 which was
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin will
indulge me, I have a question about a provision of the bill I would like to get
clarified. It relates to preemption of State usury laws for agricultural and business
loans over $25,000.
It is my understanding that, on floating rate loans where the interest is con-
tractually tied to the prime interest rate plus additional points, and where the total
effective rate that is stipulated in the contract could not be put into effect because of
the existence of State or Federal usury ceilings, the full effect of the contract inter-
est rate could be charged on the total loan amount, assuming the increase does not
exceed the limitations of this bill.
As an example, let us assume that a loan was made in January 1980, which
called for an interest rate of prime plus 5 percent. Let us assume that a State usury
law limiting such loans was 18 percent, and the effective contract rate could not be
charged, because the prime rate was 18 percent and, if the 5 percent was added, the
total would exceed the State usury law. With enactment of this bill, however, the
State usury law would be preempted and, while the lender could not charge the
maximum amount allowable in this example, 23 percent, it could charge up to 21
percent, the maximum amount allowed today under this bill.
Mr. PROXMIRE. May I say to my friend from Texas that I agree that a loan
which called for an interest rate of prime plus 5 percent, and in this example the
assumption is that prime is 18 percent, this bill would allow floating rate loans to
be adjusted upward to the maximum amount allowed under this bill.
The precise language of the particular contract would be governing, in any
particular case. But, if a contract stated that the interest rate to be charged would
be prime plus 5 percent, or the maximum amount allowed under law, not to exceed
prime plus 5 percent, or other similar language which would provide flexibility in
determining what the rate would be, I see no reason why the rate allowed under
this bill could not be charged on existing floating rate loans.
Of course, any person governed by these provisions should consult with their
own lawyer about particular factual situations because of possible penalties under
State usury laws, which, of course, differ.
126 CONG. Ruc. S3986 (daily ed. April 21, 1980). See also note 283 supra.
301. The text of the amendment is as follows:
See. -. Section 512 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"A loan shall be deemed to be made during the period described in the preceding
sentence if such loan-
"(A)(i) is funded or made in whole or in part during such period,
regardless of whether pursuant to a commitment or other agreement
therefor made prior to April 1, 1980;
"(ii) was made prior to or on April 1, 1980, and which bears or
provides for interest during such period on the outstanding amount
thereof at a variable or fluctuating rate; or
"(iii) is a renewal, extension, or other modification during such
period of any loan, if such renewal, extension, or other modification is
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added to Senate Bill 2177302 and was passed by the Senate on April 22,
1980.303 The amendment provides that section 511 applies to all float-
ing rate loans made prior to April 11, 1980. On the other hand, the fact
that an amendment is necessary in order for the preemption to apply to
existing loans suggests that the Act, as currently written, does not pre-
empt state usury laws on loans made prior to April 1. As a result, until
the Tower amendment is passed by the House, lenders should consider
carefully whether sections 511 and 512 permit them to raise the interest
rate unilaterally on existing floating rate loans to a rate in excess of that
permitted by state law.
C Obligations Issued by Depository Institutions
Section 501(a)(2) of the Depository Institutions Act provides that
state usury laws shall not apply to interest "charged, taken, received or
reserved" with respect to "any deposit or account held by or other obli-
gations of a depository institution." 3" The term "depository institu-
tion" is defined to include banks, savings banks, credit unions, savings
and loan associations, and other insured institutions except certain in-
sured banks located in Puerto Rico.3°5 The preemption is permanent
and there is no provision granting the states the power to override the
federal preemption. This provision contains language similar in con-
tent to the language of Public Law 96-16 1306 and similar in purpose to
the provisions of the Brock Bill30 7 enacted in 1974. The basic premise
is that depository institutions do not need the protection of the usury
laws and should be permitted to pay to the public any interest rate the
institution wants for the use of their funds.30 8 Although the language
in the Act is not identical to the language in Proposition 2, most deposi-
tory institutions are also exempt lenders under Proposition 2 and, as a
practical matter, there seems no justification for continued concern
made with the written consent of any person obligated to repay such loan;
and
"(B)(i) is in an original principal amount of $25,000 or more; or
"(ii) is part of a series of advances if the aggregate of all sums
advanced or agreed or contemplated to be advanced pursuant to a com-
mitment or other agreement therefor is $25,000 or more."
126 CONG. REC. S4046 (daily ed. April 22, 1980).
302. S. 2177, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
303. 126 CONG. REC. S4046 (daily ed. April 22, 1980).
304. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501(a)(2), 94 Stat. at 162.
305. Id.
306. See Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, §§ 208-210, 93 Stat. 1233, 1238-39.
307. Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557 (expired July 1, 1977). See
note 45 supra.
308. 125 CONG. REc. S15673 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
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about the possible application of the usury laws to the obligations is-
sued by such entities.
D. Other Loans
The Depository Institutions Act contains special provisions for
loans by "small business investment companies" 30 9 and it also provides
for an alternate rate for specified depository institutions of 1% per an-
num over the discount rate.310 This latter provision, unlike seciton 511,
applies to all loans, not just business and agricultural loans, and perma-
nently preempts state usury laws. However, the states are given the
power to override the federal law and there is no time limit specified
within which the states must enact such legislation.31 1 Sections 521-523
are similar to portions of the National Bank Act, which for nearly fifty
years has permitted national banks to charge the greater of rates per-
mitted by applicable state law or 1% in excess of the discount rate on
ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in
the district where the national bank is located. 2 In recent months, as
a result of rapid increases in the discount rate, this provision resulted in
a distinct advantage for national banks in many states, particularly
with respect to residential mortgage loans. 3  The provision has not
309. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 524, 94 Stat. at 166.
310. Id., §§ 521-523, 94 Stat. at 164-66. Section 521(a) provides as follows:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured banks, including
insured savings banks and insured mutual savings banks, or insured branches of
foreign banks with respect to interest rates, if the applicable rate prescribed in this
subsection exceeds the rate such State bank or insured branch of a foreign bank
would be permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection, such State bank or
such insured branch of a foreign bank may, notwithstanding any State constitution
or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section, take, receive,
reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of ex-
change, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than I per centum
in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Fed-
eral Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State bank or such
insured branch of a foreign bank is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the
State, territory, or district where the bank is located, whichever may be greater.
Similar language is contained in §§ 522 and 523 with respect to insured savings and
loan associations and insured credit unions. In addition, §§ 521(b), 522(b) and 523(b) each
provides a special penalty, similar to the penalties set forth in the National Bank Act, for
violations of the federal usury law. See 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976).
311. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 525, 94 Stat. at 167.
312. See 12 U.S.C. 85 (1976 & Supp. 1978). National banks have been described as
"national favorites" and may charge the highest rates available to any competing state
lender even though state banks may not charge such rates. See, e.g., Tiffany v. National
Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409 (1873); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439
U.S. 299 (1978).
313. This provision has been described as a "federal loophole" that was not available to
state-chartered lenders. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 2, col. 1.
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heretofore been significant in California because national banks are ex-
empt from the Usury Law and because their primary California com-
petitors with respect to residential mortgage loans, e.g., state banks and
state savings and loan associations, are likewise exempt. However, this
provision operated to discriminate against such lenders in other states.
Sections 521-523 of the Depository Institutions Act extend the
power to charge 1% per annum over the discount rate to state banks,
state savings and loan associations, and other specified institutions. On
the surface, because most of these lenders are already exempt from the
Usury Law in California, and in light of the rates permitted by section
511, it appears that this change in the law should have little impact in
this state. But when the language of sections 521-523 is coupled with
the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Marquette National
Bank v. First of Omaha Service Coro.,314 it is apparent that this part of
the Act may have far-reaching implications in California and in other
states.
In Marquette, The First National Bank of Omaha (Omaha Bank),
a national bank located in Nebraska, sought to enroll in its bank credit
card program residents, merchants, and banks in Minnesota. Under
Nebraska law and pursuant to the provisions of the National Bank
Act,315 the Omaha Bank was able to charge 18% interest on the out-
standing balances in the accounts of its BankAmericard customers.316
In contrast, national banks located in Minnesota were limited by state
law to only 12% interest.317 Although Minnesota law allowed Minne-
sota banks to charge cardholders an annual fee for the privilege of us-
ing the bank credit cards, the Minnesota banks apparently were still at
a disadvantage when the Minnesota rates were compared to the rates
charged by Nebraska banks. Thus, when the Omaha Bank began solic-
iting Minnesota customers, Marquette National Bank, a national bank
located in Minnesota, brought suit claiming that the Omaha Bank was
violating Minnesota usury law.318
The Supreme Court held that the Omaha Bank was governed by
the National Bank Act, not by Minnesota law, and that the Omaha
314. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
315. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976 & Supp. 1978). This section of the Code provides, in pertinent
part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount
made. . . interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory or District
where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate
on ninety-day commercial paper. . . whichever may be the greater. . ..
316. 439 U.S. at 302.
317. Id
318. Id. at 304.
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Bank was allowed to charge interest at the rate permitted by the state in
which it was located. 319 The Court concluded that the Omaha Bank
was located in Nebraska, notwithstanding its activities in Minnesota.
The bank could, therefore, charge Nebraska rates on all of its loan
transactions regardless of where the borrower was located or where the
transaction was consummated.32 °
Because Marquette involved only national banks, the decision did
not change the status of loans made by state banks to customers in
other states, and the validity of such loan transactions continued to be
governed by the choice-of-law principles discussed in Section IV
above. 321 However, sections 521-523 of the Depository Institutions Act
may have the effect of extending the Marquette holding to all state
banks, state savings and loan associations, and credit unions.
Section 521 provides that "/lzjn order to prevent discrimination
against State-chartered insured banks" such banks may charge interest
on any loan at the rate of 1% over the discount rate "or at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State. .. where the bank is located, whichever
may be greater.3 22 Similar provisions are contained in sections 522
and 523 with respect to insured savings and loan associations and in-
sured credit unions. The remarks of the original sponsors of section
521 indicate that its purpose is to allow state-chartered, federally in-
sured banks, and other insured institutions to charge the same rate of
interest as national banks.32 3 May insured state-chartered banks, sav-
ings and loan associations, and credit unions also take advantage of the
319. Id. at 308.
320. Id.
321. The Supreme Court in Marquette declined to interpret the term "located" as being
subject to the "elastic" principles of conflicts of law. Instead it held that the term "located"
means the state in which the national bank was issued its certificate of organization. Id. at
313.
322. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
323. In referring to the bill which he and Senator Bumpers were to introduce, Senator
Pryor commented as follows:
Mr. President, all Senators may not be aware of a statute that exists today
which gives national banks an unfair advantage over many State banks and other
financial institutions.
Section 85 of title 12 of the United States Code provides that a national bank
may charge I percent above the Federal discount rate, notwithstanding any State
laws setting an interest-rate ceiling. Such an advantage obviously discriminates in
the strongest possible way against State banks or savings and loans in those States
where the usury-rate ceiling is below the discount rate.
The bill my colleague (Mr. BUMPERS) and I shall introduce would merely al-
low State chartered, federally insured banks, federally insured savings and loans,
small business investment companies, and Federal credit unions to charge the same
interest rate as national banks.
125 CONG. REC. S15684 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979).
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Marquette decision and charge interest at the rate allowed by the state
in which such institutions are located, regardless of the location of the
borrower or the transaction? For example, a state-chartered bank lo-
cated in a state other than California may be allowed by the laws of
such state to charge interest on commercial loans at rates of up to 25%
per annum. May such bank now make a loan to a California borrower
even though the rate may exceed the rate permitted under Proposition
2? Under Marquette, a national bank located in such state clearly
could make such a loan.
The express purpose of section 521 is to prevent discrimination
against state-chartered banks, and the testimony on the floor of the
Senate when the bill was introduced makes it clear that the bill was
intended to eliminate the advantage given to national banks under the
National Bank Act.324 Although sections 522 and 523 do not contain
the preamble "in order to prevent discrimination," the balance of the
language in such sections is nearly identical to the language in section
521, and insured savings and loan associations and insured credit un-
ions should, therefore, be accorded the same privileges given to state-
-chartered banks under section 521. The language in sections 521-523 is
also based on and is similar to the language in the National Bank Act
considered by the Supreme Court in Marquette.325 Consequently, the
logical conclusion should be that all such lenders may now make loans
at interest rates permitted by the laws of the state where such lenders
are located, even though such rates may exceed the rates permitted by
the state where the borrower is located. Although this result may sur-
prise some members of Congress who may have been focusing solely
on the provision permitting loans at rates not greater than 1% over the
discount rate, it is consistent with both the language and purpose of
sections 521-523. The Supreme Court in Marquette noted that if its
holding were construed as an impairment of the ability of the states to
enact effective usury laws or if it resulted in competitive inequalities,
such arguments were better directed to the wisdom of Congress rather
than to the judgment of the Court.326 Congress seems to have reacted
to such arguments by placing all such depository institutions on an
equal footing.
324. Senator Proxmire, in discussing the intent of the proposed legislation, made the fol-
lowing statement: "What this would do would be to provide a national usury limit for ev-
erybody. We override all State laws as far as State banks are concerned-not just national
banks." 125 CONG. REc. S15684 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979).
325. See notes 313-320 supra and accompanying text.
326. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. at 319.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the significant changes in California
Usury Law resulting from the enactment of Proposition 2 and the De-
pository Institutions Act. Despite some uncertainties and ambiguities
(and notwithstanding the existence of mild frustration caused by some
less-than-perfect draftsmanship), these two provisions, acting together,
seem likely to achieve the objective of providing greater flexibility for
California loan transactions, particularly real estate and commercial
loans, thereby encouraging additional investment in California and,
perhaps, reducing interest rates.
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APPENDIX
Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurring, That the Legisla-
ture of the State of California at its 1979-80 Regular Session commenc-
ing on the fourth day of December, 1978, two-thirds of the members
elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor,
hereby proposes to the people of the State of California that the Consti-
tution of the state be amended by amending Section 1 of Article XV
thereof, to read:
SECTION 1. The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods, or things in action, or on accounts after demand,
shall be 7 percent per annum but it shall be competent for the parties to
any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action to
contract in writing for a rate of interest:
(1) For any loan or forbearance of any money, goods,
or things in action, if the money, goods, or things in action are
for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
at a rate not exceeding 10 percent per annum; provided, how-
ever, that any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action the proceeds of which are used primarily for
the purchase, construction or improvement of real property
shall not be deemed to be a use primarily for personal, family
or household purposes; or
(2) For any loan or forbearance of any money, goods,
or things in action for any use other than specified in para-
graph (1), at a rate not exceeding the higher of (a) 10 percent
per annum or (b) 5 percent per annum plus the rate prevailing
on the 25th day of the month preceding the earlier of (i) the
date of execution of the contract to make the loan or forbear-
ance, or (ii) the date of making the loan or forbearance estab-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on
advances to member banks under Sections 13 and 13a of the
Federal Reserve Act as now in effect or hereafter from time to
time amended (or if there is no such single determinable rate
of advances, the closest counterpart of such rate as shall be
designated by the Superintendent of Banks of the State of
California unless some other person or agency is delegated
such authority by the Legislature.)
No person, association, copartnership or corporation shall by
charging any fee, bonus, commission, discount or other compensation
receive from a borrower more than the interest authorized by this see-
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tion upon any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in
action.
However, none of the above restrictions shall apply to any obliga-
tions of, loans made by, or forbearance of, any building and loan asso-
ciation as defined in and which is operated under that certain act
known as the "Building and Loan Association Act," approved May 5,
1931, as amended, or to any corporation incorporated in the manner
prescribed in and operating under that certain act entitled "An act de-
fining industrial loan companies, providing for their incorporation,
powers and supervision," approved May 18, 1917, as amended, or any
corporation incorporated in the manner prescribed in and operating
under that certain act entitled "An act defining credit unions, providing
for their incorporation, powers, management and supervision," ap-
proved March 31, 1927, as amended or any duly licensed pawnbroker
or personal property broker, or any loans made or arranged by any
person licensed as a real estate broker by the State of California and
secured in whole or in part by liens on real property, or any bank as
defined in and operating under that certain act known as the "Bank
Act," approved March 1, 1909, as amended, or any bank created and
operating under and pursuant to any laws of this State or of the United
States of America or any nonprofit cooperative association organized
under Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 54001) of Division 20 of
the Food and Agricultural Code in loaning or advancing money in
connection with any activity mentioned in said title or any corporation,
association, syndicate, joint stock company, or partnership engaged ex-
clusively in the business of marketing agricultural, horticultural, viti-
cultural, dairy, live stock, poultry and bee products on a cooperative
nonprofit basis in loaning or advancing money to the members thereof
or in connection with any such business or any corporation securing
money or credit from any federal intermediate credit bank, organized
and existing pursuant to the provisions of an act of Congress entitled
"Agricultural Credits Act of 1923," as amended in loaning or advanc-
ing credit so secured, or any other class of persons authorized by stat-
ute, or to any successor in interest to any loan or forbearance exempted
under this article, nor shall any such charge of any said exempted
classes of persons be considered in any action or for any purpose as
increasing or affecting or as connected with the rate of interest herein-
before fixed. The Legislature may from time to time prescribe the max-
imum rate per annum of, or provide for the supervision, or the filing of
a schedule for, or in any manner fix, regulate or limit, the fees, bonuses,
commissions, discounts or other compensation which all or any of the
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said exempted classes of persons may charge or receive from a bor-
rower in connection with any loan or forbearance of any money, goods
or things in action.
The rate of interest upon a judgment rendered in any court of this
state shall be set by the Legislature at not more than 10 percent per
annum. Such rate may be variable and based upon interest rates
charged by federal agencies or economic indicators, or both.
In the absence of the setting of such rate by the Legislature, the
rate of interest on any judgment rendered in any court of the state shall
be 7 percent per annum.
The provisions of this section shall supersede all provisions of this
Constitution and laws enacted thereunder in conffict therewith.

